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Essays on International Trade Agreements Under Monopolistic Competition
David R. DeRemer
This dissertation consists of three essays exploring how trade models with monopolistic
competition can help us understand and evaluate the history of domestic policy coordination
in the multilateral trading system. Relative to perfect competition, imperfect competition
gives rise to new cross-border concerns that governments do not internalize when setting
both trade policy and domestic policy. An open question is whether these international
policy externalities matter for the design of the multilateral trading system.
The rst chapter develops the workhorse model for the dissertation and applies it to the
evolution of subsidy rules in the multilateral trading system. Why did countries achieve a
consensus to impose explicit restrictions on trade-distorting subsidies when the WTO was
formed in 1995, but not decades earlier under the GATT? This chapter rationalizes the
historical pattern of subsidy rules. Politically-motivated governments benet from inter-
national subsidy restraints only after achieving su¢ cient cooperation in restraining tari¤s.
Once tari¤s fall, as they did in the 1950s and 1960s, governments prefer to protect domestic
sales through international subsidy restraints and countervailing duties rather than to allow
consumers to benet from unfettered subsidization.
The second chapter applies the same model to the international coordination of com-
petition policy (antitrust in the United States). In 1948, 53 nations signed the Havana
Charter which would have led to the creation of the International Trade Organization and
international coordination of competition policy, if the charter had been ratied by the U.S.
Congress. Decades later, there is no direct international coordination of competition pol-
icy, despite direct coordination in other domestic policies. The theory argues that when
countries have noncooperative policies, international coordination toward stronger competi-
tion policy can lead to increased consumer welfare. As countries reduce import tari¤s, they
tend away from coordination on stronger competition policy and toward no coordination or
weaker competition policy. The model predicts that if countries were ever to coordinate on
competition policy, it would be toward weaker competition policy.
The rst two chapters each argue that externalities arising under imperfect competition
can explain the history of domestic policy coordination, given the actual path of trade
liberalization. In contrast, the nal chapter evaluates whether the world trading system could
have chosen rules that eliminate these externalities. If these externalities could have been
eliminated, then monopolistic competition does not create any new fundamental problem for
trade agreements to solve. We re-evaluate two claims about international externalities that
hold true under perfect competition and are also consistent with the rules and norms of the
1947 GATT: (1) reciprocal trade negotiations can guide countries toward globally e¢ cient
policies, such that countries act as if they do not value their ability to manipulate their terms
of trade, and (2) globally e¢ cient policies can be preserved by rules that prevent countries
from using domestic policies to undermine the market access implied by tari¤ negotiations.
This chapter shows that both claims fail to hold when countries have subsidies for the
marginal cost of production and subsidies for rm entry. The source of ine¢ ciency is countries
free-riding o¤ of each others entry subsidies. A market access rule that preserves both a
trading partners home volume and export volume can prevent opportunism in domestic
policy choices. The results suggest that the rise of trade in imperfect competition was a
factor in limiting the e¤ectiveness of the 1947 GATT rules, long before other challenges for
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The Evolution of International Subsidy Rules
1.1. Introduction
The expanded restrictions on manufacturing subsidies in the World Trade Organization
(WTO) since 1995 are a signicant departure from the 1947 General Agreement on Tar-
i¤s and Trade.1 Export subsidies are prohibited in the WTO, and domestic subsidies that
increase exports can be disputed. Countervailing duties, unilateral tari¤s contingent on sub-
sidies, became a more entrenched part of the WTO. Government consternation over export
subsidies puzzles trade lawyers and economists because export subsidies improve the terms
of trade for importing countries and increase trade.2 When the only cross-border e¤ect of
export subsidies is the terms-of-trade improvement of the importing country, then the export
subsidies are like a gift from abroad, and there is no reason for countries to restrict each other
from using them. Limits on domestic subsidies can be harmful because domestic subsidies
are the best instrument governments can use to address domestic distortions.3 According to
Bagwell and Staiger (2006), the WTO subsidy rules serve no purpose in plausible cases, even
for politically motivated governments.4 Moreover, the rules could "completely undermine"
the GATT, because countries could be forced to eliminate socially benecial subsidies as a
consequence of committing to low tari¤s. For all these reasons, Mavroidis, Messerlin, and
1Section 1.2 provides detailed historical background.
2For example, Janow and Staiger (2003) argue that the export subsidy prohibition runs against the GATTs
fundamental purpose of increasing trade from ine¢ ciently low levels.
3The theory of distortions and welfare dates back to Bhagwati and Ramaswami (1963). More recently,
Stiglitz (2006) and Rodrik (2011) argue that the WTO subsidy rules are particularly damaging for developing
countries where market imperfections are more prevalent.
4The one scenario in which Bagwell and Staiger (2006) nd a justication for the WTO subsidy rules occurs
when subsidy use is of minor importance on the e¢ ciency frontier, but the authors consider this scenario to
be inconsistent with the stated view of GATT members that some subsidy use is desirable. The inability
of countries to impose domestic taxes and a cost for applying GATT rules are other conditions required for
WTO rules to be benecial in their paper.
2Wauters (2008) denounce the subsidy agreement as "one of the least economics-informed
agreements in the WTO." The potential drawbacks of the WTO subsidy rules call for a
better understanding of why the rules were adopted. Why were the WTO subsidy rules
adopted? Why were they not implemented sooner?
To address these questions, this chapter proposes the following model. There are two
governments who each choose a domestic subsidy, an ad valorem import tari¤ and an ad
valorem export subsidy. The two symmetric countries each have two sectors: a freely traded
outside sector and a monopolistically-competitive, di¤erentiated sector with costly trade.
Firm entry in the di¤erentiated sector requires the employment of capital factor while pro-
duction requires labor in each sector. The governments domestic subsidy reduces the cost of
rm entry and fully determines the number of rms in each country. Firm prots accrue to
capital owners and government objectives give greater weight to prots than to other forms
of national income.
This chapter establishes the novel result that countries could achieve a global consensus
to impose limits on both export subsidies and export-promoting domestic subsidies, as in
the WTO.5 Consider a country, foreign, choosing subsidies unilaterally, subject to the GATT
constraint that ensures foreigns subsidies do not reduce the access another country, home,
has to foreigns market.6 Despite the GATT constraint, foreign does not consider three
e¤ects of higher subsidies on home: a decrease in homes domestic prots, an increase in
homes consumer surplus from the subsidized sector, and an increase in homes import tari¤
revenue. The net cross-border e¤ect of the foreign subsidy on home can be negative, provided
that home places a su¢ ciently large weight on prots in the subsidized sector and homes
import tari¤s are su¢ ciently small. A net negative cross-border e¤ect implies that the two
5The consensus distinguishes the theory from prior work. Brander and Spencer (1985) and Bagwell and
Staiger (2001b) each provide theories of why two countries would limit export subsidies at the expense of a
third country who only imports.
6The constraint is a consequence of Article XXIII in the GATT. Bagwell and Staiger (2001a, 2006) model
the GATT in similar fashion.
3countriesunilateral subsidy choices are too high. When considering the e¤ects of foreign
policies on home consumption, home prefers changes that raise the home price index. A
Pareto superior outcome for the two governments can be achieved by an agreement limiting
subsidies.
The chapter further shows that regardless of the weight governments place on domestic
prots, countries cannot benet from the WTOs limits on subsidies when import tari¤s are
close to noncooperative levels, as when the GATT was formed. The net e¤ect of a foreign
subsidy on home welfare must be positive at unilateral tari¤ choices. The foreign subsidy
increases home import tari¤ revenue and it decreases the home price index, and both e¤ects
benet home. In contrast to the zero-tari¤ case in which home values a price index increase
under strong political motives, home always values a price index decrease at the noncoopera-
tive import tari¤s. Home values the price index decrease because when setting import tari¤s,
home always benets from gaining tari¤ revenue on the inframarginal import volume, and in
equilibrium, home must balance this benet by setting the price index higher than it would
otherwise prefer.7 Absent a model, one might have speculated that su¢ ciently strong politi-
cal economy e¤ects could also motivate a subsidy limit agreement at noncooperative import
tari¤s. But the same political economy concerns that motivate subsidy rules also motivate
higher unilateral import tari¤s, and the noncooperative equilibrium conditions guarantee
that subsidies lead to positive cross-border externalities. Imposing limits on subsidies can-
not be Pareto-improving until governments achieve su¢ cient cooperation in reducing tari¤s.
Hence, the second main result of the chapter is that the WTOs subsidy rules were desirable
only after several successive rounds of tari¤ reductions under the GATT.
7A similar argument explains why export subsidies must yield positive externalities in the model of Bagwell
and Staiger (2006). When countries set import tari¤s noncooperatively in such a two-good, perfectly com-
petitive environment, they set the local price of imported goods higher than they would otherwise prefer,
as proven in Bagwell and Staiger (1999) and Bagwell and Staiger (2002, p. 60-61, 192). When a country
proceeds to import subsidized products, it benets from both the local price decrease and an improvement
in its terms of trade.
4Having considered the motivation to limit subsidies beyond the GATT market access
constraint, the chapter next turns to the subject of countervailing duties. In the two-country
case, countries can use countervailing duties as an alternative to enforcing subsidy limits.
If countries impose countervailing duties to counter an undesired subsidy, then they are
e¤ectively insulated from the trade volume e¤ects and they collect tari¤ revenue on the
subsidy. The countervailing duty can fail to be an e¤ective remedy when we move beyond
the two-country case. The model can easily be extended to three symmetric countries, and
we show that adding countries strengthens the case for using the multilateral subsidy limits
rather than the unilateral countervailing duties.
Two papers closely related to this chapter are by Bagwell and Staiger (2001a), who found
no reason for governments to constrain domestic policies beyond GATT rules, and Bagwell
and Staiger (2009), who found that monopolistic competition did not give rise to any new
externalities for a trade agreement to solve beyond the standard perfectly competitive case.
The di¤erence is that this chapter considers a domestic policy that a¤ects exported product
variety and does not travel through local or world (o¤shore) prices. Such a policy that in-
creases exported variety could then be considered a nonpecuniary externality.8 The creation
of new products is the simplest example of a nonpecuniary externality arising through sub-
sidization, but such a nonpecuniary externality could arise more generally from any subsidy
that a¤ects product characteristics. Bagwell and Staiger (2001a) acknowledge that a nonpe-
cuniary externality could create additional problems in their framework, but the examples
they consider involve consumers who care directly about foreign labor and environmental
standards, and the authors suggest that these problems be handled outside of the WTO.
They do not consider that subsidies could create nonpecuniary externalities, and subsidies
have always been within the purview of the GATT and WTO. An additional distinction
8We could also classify rm entry as creating a pecuniary externality that causes a discrete drop in price from
a prohibitive level. The classication is unimportant, because neither discrete price changes nor nonpecuniary
externalities t into the Bagwell and Staiger (2001a) framework.
5from Bagwell and Staiger (2009) is that they only consider trade policies, and all trade pol-
icy externalities go through price channels. The domestic policies here play a similar role to
import tari¤s in Ossa (2011), who observes that trade agreements must address imperfect
competition externalities given that countries ban export subsidies. A di¤erence between this
chapter and Ossa is that domestic policies create a fundamental problem for trade agree-
ments, rather than one that arises as a consequence of other trade agreement restrictions.9
The WTO subsidy rules are one response to the fundamental problem.
A previous formal analysis of whether political motives can rationalize the WTO subsidy
rules, Bagwell and Staiger (2006), found no rationale in an environment with costless appli-
cation of the GATT rules.10 Countries do not have any reason to impose export-promoting
subsidies, so there is also no role for countervailing duties in achieving or maintaining e¢ -
cient policies.11 The same three cross-border e¤ects of foreign subsidies in the current chapter
can exist in their perfectly competitive model, but a di¤erence arises because subsidies to
foreigns export sector inuence all three e¤ects solely through changes in terms of trade in
their model. In their framework, the sum of the three e¤ects is positive whenever two sym-
metric countries choose noncooperative import tari¤s or pursue a symmetric liberalization
path to lower e¢ cient tari¤s. At any point along such a symmetric liberalization path, the
assumption that countries benet from receiving a pure transfer in either good equivalent
to a terms-of-trade gain holding local prices xed ultimately implies that countries must
9The third chapter of this dissertation focuses more on this claim.
10Many other papers explain international subsidy limits but focus on subsidies to import-competing indus-
tries, which are restrained by GATT Article XXIII. Such papers include Horn, Maggi, and Staiger (2010),
Brou and Ruta (2009), Sauré (2010), and Lee (2011). The current paper and Bagwell and Staiger (2006)
take as given that Article XXIII is perfectly functional.
11The role for countervailing duties in the current chapter is similar to the seminal results of Dixit (1984,
1988) on countervailing duties in Cournot oligopoly, but we distinctly focus on how countervailing duties
complement other GATT/WTO rules and how the rules evolve.
6benet from a foreign subsidy that improves homes terms of trade.12 In the current chap-
ter, countries benet, all else equal, from a terms-of-trade gain a pure transfer between
treasuries in the outside good. But because foreign export subsidies inuence home apart
from changes in terms of trade, the sign of cross-border foreign subsidy e¤ects along the
liberalization path is not pinned down by the assumption that countries always benet, all
else equal, from a terms-of-trade gain.
The current paper provides a theory for a consensus restriction on export subsidies and
domestic trade-promoting subsidies. While prior theory such as Brander and Spencer (1985)
and Bagwell and Staiger (2001b) explain why common exporters would collude to limit
their subsidies, this literature includes a third country that imports these goods and would
not benet from subsidy rules. As Bagwell and Staiger (forthcoming b) show, the globally
e¢ cient policy is for all countries to subsidize so that prices equal marginal costs, leaving
no motive for subsidy constraints, and another essential feature of this papers argument for
subsidy rules is that the imperfectly goods are consumed by the producing countries13, and
there is no way for countries to eliminate all monopoly distortions.14 Bagwell and Staiger
(2006) acknowledge but do not model the possibility that GATT subsidy disciplines could
fail when two countries compete in third markets. They suggest that the GATT rules could
be extended to three countries but do not o¤er any details on how this could be achieved.
This chapter interprets the WTO subsidy rules as an approach to dealing with third-market
problems when countervailing duty action is di¢ cult to coordinate. An advantage of the
current chapters framework is that it can easily be extended to multiple symmetric countries.
12Along the liberalization path, countries benet from a fall in the domestic price of the imported good, all
else equal, as in Bagwell and Staiger (2002, p. 60-61). When a foreign subsidy increase improves homes
terms-of-trade, home benets from both the fall in domestic price and the direct e¤ect of the terms-of-trade
improvement.
13Appendix section F.1 shows that no motive would exist for subsidy rules if the countries exported di¤er-
entiated goods to a third market and did not consume them themselves.
14To assume countries lack policy to eliminate imperfectly competitive distortions is typical of the trade
policy literature, beginning with the seminal oligopolistic work of Dixit (1984), who believed such policies
were unrealistic, as well as more recent work such as Ossa (2011) and Bagwell and Staiger (2009, forthcoming
a, forthcoming b), whose countries have no domestic policies.
7Another closely related paper, Bagwell and Staiger (forthcoming a), provides an alterna-
tive explanation for the evolution of export subsidy rules using a model with linear Cournot
competition. A unique property of international Cournot competition is that a foreign in-
crease in export subsidy or reduction in export tari¤ gives home a terms-of-trade loss.15 In
their model, nations would unilaterally deviate from an e¢ cient, free-trade equilibrium using
export subsidies, so export subsidy bans are desirable at free trade.16 Yet at the equilibrium
where both import and export policies are chosen noncooperatively, countries choose both
import and export taxes and countries benet when they exchange small reductions in these
taxes. An important di¤erence between their paper and the current chapter is theirs does
not consider domestic subsidies. By providing a theory for the WTOs limits on domestic
subsidies, the current chapter addresses a broader debate over the appropriate scope of the
WTO in regulating domestic policies.17 Moreover, the WTOs limits on domestic subsidies
have not been made consistent with the theory that the GATTs fundamental purpose is to
increase trade volumes from ine¢ ciently low levels. By rationalizing these policies, the cur-
rent chapter implies that the WTO has addressed a wider range of international externalities
than the standard theory, given the absence of alternative explanations.18
15In perfect competition (Bagwell and Staiger 1999), monopolistic competition (Bagwell and Staiger 2009),
or Cournot competition without free entry (Bagwell and Staiger forthcoming b), the export subsidy at free
trade worsens the terms of trade. The current paper shows that the rationale for export subsidy constraints
need not depend on the Cournot framework.
16Venables (1985) was the rst to identify that a country would unilaterally deviate from free trade with an
export subsidy in such a Cournot trade model.
17Examples include Bagwell, Mavroidis and Staiger (2002), Staiger and Sykes (2011), and Bagwell and
Mavroidis (2010). Bhagwati (1996) defends the GATTs capability of handling labor and environmental
issues. Bhagwati defends the GATT approach to domestic policies in his concluding remarks of a 2010
Economist debate on fair trade vs. free trade.
18Cross-border externalities that arise under imperfect competition can rationalize the GATT/WTO princi-
ples of reciprocity and nondiscrimination, as shown in Ossa (2011) and Mrazova (2011), but both principles
can also be explained by the terms-of-trade theory of trade agreements. The current paper is distinct in
explaining WTO rules that have not been explained by the terms-of-trade theory.
81.2. Historical and Legal Background
This chapter details salient features in the evolution of multilateral discipline on subsidies
and countervailing measures. These features are what discipline the theory of this chapter.
Histories that are more comprehensive but less focused on this chapters points of interest
can be found in Sykes (2005), WTO (2006), and Wouter and Coppens (2010). The rst
subsection considers the GATTs history of regulating domestic subsidies, export subsidies,
and countervailing duties. The next subsection considers evidence of the motives behind the
Uruguay Round negotiations (1987-1995) that led to the WTOs Agreement on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures (SCM). The nal subsection considers how well the models
focus on entry subsidies matches WTO practice.
1.2.1. GATT Rules
The main provision constraining domestic policies under the GATT was the Article XXIII
nonviolation complaint. The rule, rst formally modeled by Bagwell and Staiger (2001a),
"ensures that the level of market access commitments implied by tari¤ negotiations [in
Article II] is not eroded by subsequent changes in domestic policies" (545). A 1955 GATT
working party report19 explains that the contracting parties believed that domestic subsidy
regulation of Article XXIII was su¢ cient to require no further strengthening of domestic
policy provisions:
TheWorking Party considered many proposals for strengthening the present
provisions of the Agreement with respect to the use of subsidies. So far as
domestic subsidies are concerned, it was agreed that a contracting party
which has negotiated a concession under Article II may be assumed, for
the purpose of Article XXIII, to have a reasonable expectation, failing evi-
dence to the contrary, that the value of the concession will not be nullied
or impaired by the contracting party which granted the concession by the
subsequent introduction of a domestic subsidy on the product concerned.
19GATT document L/334, 1 March 1955.
9Based on the strong endorsement of Article XXIII, this paper takes as given that the Ar-
ticle XXIII nonviolation complaint was functional. When evaluating the WTO subsidy rules,
we ask why additional rules subsidy limits or countervailing duties would be necessary in
addition to Article XXIII.
The GATT had a longer history of limiting export subsidies than domestic subsidies,
but a crucial di¤erence from the GATT and WTO is the absence of a consensus to limit
export subsidies. Manufacturing export subsidies were originally subject to a mere reporting
requirement in Article XVI. As Irwin, Mavroidis, and Sykes (2008) detail, there was some
discussion of limiting export subsidies in the original GATT, but U.S. negotiators did not
consider these proposals further because they did not have authority to limit export subsidies
under the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA) of 1945, and the RTAA allowed the
Truman Administration to implement GATT without Congressional approval. Beginning
in 1962, thirteen developed countries began to limit manufacturing export subsidies while
requiring no such rules for primary products (e.g. agriculture). Such an agreement matches
well with the existing Brander and Spencer (1985) theory, in which manufacturing coun-
tries collude to limit subsidies at the expense of importers of manufactured goods. Indeed,
the Australian delegation, a primary product exporter, was displeased with the plurilateral
export subsidy agreement: "The Article was weak because of the glaring and invidious com-
parison between weak limitations on subsidies of primary products as compared with the
ban on subsidies of manufacturing goods."20 Because existing theory is adequate to explain
this 1962 subsidy agreement, this chapter does not focus on it further, and instead focuses
on explaining the consensus agreement to limit export subsidies that occurred in the WTO.
Countervailing duties (CVDs) existed in the GATT, but they were more a blatant form of
protection by the United States than an e¢ ciency-enhancing remedy. Because the 1897 U.S.
CVD law predated the GATT, it was grandfathered in, and unlike other countries, the U.S.
20GATT document SR-9/41, 3 March 1955.
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was permitted to countervail without demonstrating that its domestic industry had been
injured by the subsidized imports, up until 1980 (Wouters and Coppen 2010). The U.S. was
the primary user of CVDs under the GATT, accounting for 110 of 128 CVDs reported to
the GATT Secretariat between 1980 and 1991 (Sykes 2005). Because the U.S. applied most
CVDs and had limited standards in doing so, the GATT CVD best ts into this chapters
framework as a conventional failure of import tari¤ cooperation, and the level of import tari¤
cooperation is exogenous on the model. The chapter takes the position that CVDs played
an e¢ ciency-enhancing role only in the WTO.
1.2.2. WTO Negotiating History
A recurring question in the trade agreement literature is whether international trade agree-
ments are a means to eliminate cross-border externalities through cooperation, or a commit-
ment device for avoiding domestic political pressures. While this chapter and most literature
on the WTO has taken the former view, Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (2007) take the latter
view, and Brou and Ruta (2009) construct a theory of the WTO subsidy rules as solving
a commitment problem. This subsection discusses evidence for what problems subsidy rule
negotiators believed they were solving.
A note from the GATT secretariat21 at the outset of the negotiations is most insightful:
A number of problems have arisen in the case of production subsidies.
The General Agreement does not limit their use, and the requirement not
to prejudice the interests of other contracting parties is very vague. In
particular it is unclear who has to make the determination of prejudice,
how the prejudice should be assessed and whether the obligation to discuss
the possibility of limiting the subsidization implies that the subsidizing
contracting party must take action to limit the subsidy in question. The
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures has provided some
disciplines as to the e¤ects in the sense that signatories are obliged to seek
to avoid causing, through the use of any subsidy, adverse e¤ects to the
interest of another signatory. It also established a procedure to determine
the existence of adverse e¤ects and to take a remedial action. To the
21GATT document MTN.GNG/NG10/W/4, 28 April 1987.
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extent that these e¤ects have arisen in the domestic market of the importing
country, they have been dealt with through the use of countervailing duties.
As the importing country has an e¢ cient deterrent against these e¤ects,
the problems result rather from possible abuse of this deterrent. However,
regarding adverse e¤ects arising in the domestic market of the subsidizing
country or in the third country market, the obligations under the Agreement
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures to avoid causing such e¤ects are
hardly enforceable.
The importance of competition in third markets is echoed by Sykes (2005):
The opportunity to challenge such subsidies as violations of WTO law is an
important step forward.... Under prior law, domestic subsidies that harmed
import-competing industries abroad could merely be countervailed by the
importing nation, which is an inferior option.... Countervailing duties do
not necessarily discourage undesirable subsidization, and may simply divert
subsidized goods to other markets.
The theory in this chapter matches the view of the secretariat and Sykes that the purpose
of the subsidy rules is to prevent subsidies from having adverse e¤ects (cross-border exter-
nalities) in each others markets and in the markets of third countries. Unlike Bagwell and
Staiger (2006), countervailing duties are seen as playing an essential role in the agreement.
Another contrast is that the text implies that the Article XXIII nonviolation complaint is no
longer seen as e¤ective at preventing "adverse e¤ects arising in the domestic market of the
subsidizing country."22 This chapter nonetheless follows Bagwell and Staiger (2001, 2006)
and assumes that Article XXIII handles adverse e¤ects and looks to what other subsidy
problems can emerge in the WTO.
The secretariats note works against the view that subsidies were an undesirable that
governments needed to tie their hands from, though these views are not necessarily stable
over time. Dating back to the GATT negotiations, a 1946 UN Economics and Social Council
meeting23 presents a favorable view towards subsidies:
One of the main features of the United States proposals on subsidies was
that direct subsidies to producers would be permitted. The United States
22See also Roessler and Gappah (2005) for a critique of the Article XXIII nonviolation complaint and a
summary of its case history.
23E/FC/T/C.II/37, UN Economics and Social Council 31 October 46 meeting.
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Delegation felt that subsidies were preferable to import restrictions or tar-
i¤s. Subsidies kept prices down and demand up. They were expansionist
rather than contractionist measures.
Bagwell and Staiger (2006) also argue that GATT members believed subsidies were nec-
essary to achieve e¢ cient policies.
Other scholars have argued that the WTO SCM was a consequence of market funda-
mentalism. For example, Qin (2008) argues, "The SCM was negotiated in the late 80s and
early 90s when the world was moving towards embracing free market and privatization. It
is therefore not surprising to nd that the SCM Agreement imposes very strict disciplines
and contains no general exceptions."24 The negotiating history of the Uruguay Round o¤ers
evidence in support of this claim, despite the initial note from the secretariat. The negoti-
ating postures of the United States in this regard changed rather abruptly, as can be seen
in the statements surrounding its views on allowing developing countries to be exempt from
subsidy restrictions. In May 1987, the U.S. is permissive toward the developing country
exceptions in GATT Article XIV:25
The United States believes that it would be useful to review the application
of Article 14 in the context of the more advanced developing countries.
The United States also believes that it would be useful to examine the
application of Article 14 to economic sectors in which an industry in a
developing country is internationally competitive and, as a result, the need
for subsidies to facilitate the economic development program of that country
is not readily apparent.
But 13 months later, the U.S. is taking the opposite position, and taking a negative view
of subsidies more in line with the commitment theory:26
National policies providing subsidies which directly or indirectly a¤ect trade
create false incentives to producers, isolating them from the signals of the
market. This has led to ine¢ cient use of resources and costly budgetary
outlays. In the view of the United States, the elimination of export subsidies






and greater adherence to GATT rules and disciplines regarding domestic
subsidies would lead to more e¢ cient use of resources, improved market
access, and greater economic growth.
There is evidence for both the current theory and the commitment theory during the
Uruguay Round, and the two theories can complement each other, as in other aspects of the
trade agreement literature. The current theory provides an explanation for why countries
encouraged subsidies in the 1940s and for the motives laid out by the secretariat at the
outset of the Uruguay Round, and the commitment theory matches well with motives that
emerged later in the round.
1.2.3. Entry Subsidies and the GATT/WTO
A distinctive feature of this chapter is its emphasis on problems created by subsidies that
a¤ect entry. The theory matches well with the seminal empirical countervailing duty study of
Marvel and Ray (1995), who document that "many of the subsidies in question appear to have
covered xed costs." The authors interpret this stylized fact as evidence that countervailing
duties are not used to address legitimate prot-shifting concerns, due to the absence of any
theory of strategic motives for xed cost subsidies. Grossman and Mavroidis (2001, 2003)
argue WTO panels have failed to follow the intentions of WTO founders in regulating these
subsidies, hence their title choice, "Recurring Misunderstanding of Non-Recurring Subsidies.
More recently, Baylis (2009) notes the need for theory on strategic motivations for xed cost
subsidies in her survey of the countervailing duty and strategic trade policy literature.
Among the most prominent examples of xed cost subsidies in the WTO era is the
Boeing-Airbus case, in which Boeing has challenged European Union "launch aid." The EU
reduces Airbuscost of nancing the development of new aircraft varieties, which cut into
Boeings market share in several markets. Naturally, there are several complications of the
aircraft industry not captured by model. Boeing and Airbus are multi-product duopolists
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who o¤shore and use complex supply chains. The model nonetheless captures the core feature
of the dispute subsidies leading to the expansion of varieties.
1.3. The Model: Government Objectives and Externalities
The model builds on Section 7.3 of Helpman and Krugman (1989) by adding an export
subsidy and a domestic entry subsidy.27 We further simplify by assuming symmetric tech-
nology, endowments, and preferences across the two large countries, home and foreign. The
economy has two sectors: a monopolistically competitive sector of symmetric rms produc-
ing di¤erentiated products and a quasilinear freely traded numeraire good. There are two
factors: a labor factor mobile between the two sectors and a specic factor necessary for
entry in the di¤erentiated sector. The factors are owned by consumers who take prices and
government policies as given and maximize utility. Firms take government policy and the
consumer price index as given and maximize prots. Individual rms and consumers are too
small to behave strategically. The remainder of the chapter focuses on the strategic behavior
between the two governments.
After laying out the model, this section determines the governments objectives as a
function of home and foreign policy choices. The objectives allow us to derive the cross-
border externalities of government policies. Here externalities refer to the cross-border e¤ects
of policies that a government does not internalize when it chooses policies unilaterally. We
formally model the GATT rules, and we dene what it means to improve upon the GATT.
The GATT rules can manage some cross-border e¤ects, but not all of them. The third
section of the chapter focuses on the balance of the remaining externalities.
27Related contributions are Flan and Helpman (1987) and Venables (1987), who consider unilateral trade and
domestic policies in two-country models with monopolistically competitive rms. Ossa (2011) and Bagwell
and Staiger (2009) consider trade agreements under monopolistic competition, but do not consider domestic
policies. All four papers use a single-factor model, while the current paper uses a two-factor model.
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1.3.1. Baseline Model
Government: The home government chooses an ad valorem import tari¤  , an export
subsidy s, and a subsidy to entry e. The foreign government chooses a corresponding set of
policies  , s, and e. A negative import tari¤ indicates an import subsidy, and a negative
export subsidy indicates an export tax, but we will primarily focus on situations when
governments choose import tari¤s and export subsidies. Nondistortionary transfers between
government and consumers balance any budget decit or surplus.
Government objectives assign a weight 1 to consumer surplus and a weight  to the rents
accruing to the specic factor (e.g. producer surplus) Microfoundations for such government
objectives come from the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model of lobbying, and Chang
(2005) extends the results to a framework with monopolistic competition.28
For the existence of noncooperative and cooperative equilibria, we require  < , where
 is the elasticity of substitution between di¤erentiated products. If the political economy
weight  were greater than , countries would give boundless export subsidies to their
producers.
Consumption: Consumers in each country all have income large enough to ensure








(D) + Y .
28The additional weight on producer prots is motivated by Hufbauer and Erb (1984, p. 8) and Baldwin
(1980, p. 86), who argue that producerssense of entitlement to their domestic markets has always been
central to subsidy rules. Mavroidis, Messerlin, and Wauters (2008) observe the WTO subsidy rules are
focused on producer interests.
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The utility functions imply an elasticity of substitution " = 1
1  between sectors. D is a
CES composite good over nh symmetric home products and nf symmetric foreign products.

























The elasticities of substitution satisfy  > " > 1. For consumption variables c, subscripts h
and f denote location of origin, while the superscript "*" indicates location of consumption,
so cf is home imports and ch is foreign imports.
Marginal Production: The good Y has a unit labor requirement and is freely traded
between sectors. The di¤erentiated products have marginal labor requirement m. To ship
one unit abroad requires an iceberg trade cost, additional production of the good that "melts"
in transit. The trade cost is   0.
Firm Entry: Countries each have a capital endowment K specic for entry into the
di¤erentiated sector. Some consumers own capital and some do not, ensuring a motive for
capital lobbying. Governments can reduce the capital requirement with an entry subsidy.
The government subsidizes entry in the di¤erentiated sector by hiring labor to produce a
public good specic to the di¤erentiated sector. The capital requirement is given by the
function k(e), such that k is strictly decreasing in the government subsidy e. Firm prots
accrue to the owners of the specic factor. The domestic entry subsidies e and e determine









The function k can be inverted to express the cost to the government of having a given








)  f(nf ).
A simple feasible functional form is k(e) = K
e+
for a scale parameter  and a shift parameter




is the number of rms absent
any entry subsidy. The model could conceivably admit a more general functional form for
k, provided that the government objectives are concave in the number rms chosen.29 We
require a restriction on the shift parameter  that ensures countries o¤er positive entry
subsidies at all equilibria under consideration.30 The scale parameter for k(e) is subject
to an additional restriction to ensure there is a cooperative equilibrium with zero tari¤s.
Discussion of the restriction is postponed to Section 1.3.5.
The structure here allows us to consider, in a simple way, government ability to inuence
the extensive margin of rm entry, while at the same time not allowing free entry to eliminate
any lobbying motive for rms, as would be the case in a single-factor model.31 As discussed
in Section 1.2.3, consideration of xed cost subsidies is empirically justied. A richer model
would allow owners of capital to hire more labor in response to prot opportunities. Such
a model would fall in between the extremes of this chapters model and a single-factor free
entry model. The simplication that government e¤ectively chooses the number of rms has
29The elasticity of welfare with respect to rm entry, absent f(n), is " 1 1 , so at the very least we require
f(n) to be more convex than n(
" 1
 1 ), and a linear cost function meets this requirement since " 1 1 < 1.
30A decrease in  lowers the number of rms with no entry subsidies. Being a constant in f(n),  has no
e¤ect on rst-order conditions and second-order conditions that determine noncooperative and constrained
choices of nh and nf .
31Models with single-factor free entry are derived in Appendix F. The idea that such free entry can eliminate
strategic trade motives has been well understood since Horstmann and Markusen (1986).
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precedent in the international competition policy literature.32 In the current chapter, the
approach o¤ers tractability for studying interactions between domestic policy choices and
trade policies, and such interactions have received little attention apart from Bagwell and
Staiger (2001a, 2006).
1.3.2. Determining Government Objectives
To evaluate the government objectives, we nd the equilibrium consumption and production
taking government policies as given.
Freely mobile labor implies wages are equal across sectors, and prot maximization im-
plies the wage equals the price of the homogeneous good. Free trade in the homogeneous
good implies the prices of the homogeneous good and wages are equal across countries. The
wage and price of the quasilinear good are dened to be the numeraire.
Utility maximization implies demand for the composite good D = P ", where P is
the price index for the composite good and PD is the total expenditure on di¤erentiated




"  1PD + I =
1
"  1P








The notation for prices ph, pf , ph, and p

f matches the consumption variables ch, cf , c

h, and
cf . The price index P is standard following Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) under symmetric rms:
32Dixit (1984), Horn and Levinsohn (2001), and Bagwell and Staiger (2002, Ch. 9) each consider a domestic
competition policy (e.g. antritrust policy) that directly determines the number of domestic rms in a
Cournot market. Only Bagwell and Staiger (2002, Ch. 9) consider whether there is an additional rationale




















Market demand xh for a home product is the sum of domestic demand and foreign
demand, plus the iceberg transport costs:





f + (1 + )cf .









 " + (1 + )p f P
 ".
Because markets are integrated, imports are marked up from domestic prices based on
total net cross-border costs:
ph = (1 + + 
   s)ph, and(1.9)
pf = (1 + +    s)pf .
Since demand functions have a constant price elasticity, prot-maximization implies a
constant local price for domestic varieties ph and pf :
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(1.10) ph = pf =

   1m  p.
The prices do not depend on tari¤s, as emphasized in Ossa (2011), or on rm entry, as
emphasized here. World prices pwh and p
w
f are the prices of home and foreign exports between
borders. They depend only on the export subsidy:
pwh = (1  s)ph, and(1.11)
pwf = (1  s)pf .
The per unit markup p m = p

determines home and foreign domestic per rm prots








h = nhh, and f = nff .
Home government objectives can be decomposed as follows:
 Prots (with political economy weight )  h










h = (1  chxh )h
 Consumption
Consumer surplus  1
" 1PD
Import tari¤ revenue  pnfcf
Export subsidy cost   spnhch
Entry subsidy cost   f(nh)
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Wage income  L
A corresponding decomposition holds for foreign. The government objectives G and G
are then
G = h +
1
"  1PD + pnfcf   spnhc

h   f(nh) + L, and(1.13)
G = f +
1
"  1P
D +  pnhch   spnfcf   f(nf ) + L:
For cooperative policies, the government joint objective W  G +G, and
(1.14)
W = (h+f )+
1
"  1(PD+P
D)+ (   s)pnfcf +(   s)pnhch f(nh) f(nf )+2L.
The sum of the two objectives is justied here because we consider symmetric choices
throughout. W can be written in terms of net trade taxes, which we dene as tf  (   s)
for foreign-produced goods and th  (    s) for home-produced goods.
1.3.3. Import Tari¤Results
This section considers noncooperative and cooperative tari¤s. We introduce an unobjec-
tionable assumption that ensures the standard result that countriesnoncooperative import
tari¤s are larger than their cooperative import tari¤s.
At the noncooperative equilibrium in trade policies, each countrys import and export
subsidy choice is unilaterally optimal. At the cooperative equilibrium, each countrys total
trade barriers are picked to maximize world welfare. The cooperative equilibrium depends
only on total trade barriers because W only depends on total trade barriers. Existence of
the cooperative equilibrium in trade policies is established in Appendix B:
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We establish a rst lemma that net trade taxes are higher at noncooperative trade policies
than cooperative trade policies, so noncooperative trade policy choices result in too little
trade. All lemmas are proven in Appendix C.


















ds = 0. Then 
N , sN , tc do not depend on e, N > 0, and
tN > tC.
The lack of dependence of the noncooperative trade policies N and sN , and fully coop-
erative trade barriers tc on the level of entry subsidies (and hence the number of rms) is a
consequence of CES preferences and the symmetry between countries. The policies maximiz-
ing the joint objective W involve subsidizing trade as a second-best attempt to correct the
monopoly distortion, so countries would benet when moving from noncooperative policies
to policies with zero net trade taxes.33
Many trade policy models su¤er the di¢ culty that cooperative trade policies could arise
from either reducing import tari¤s or increasing export subsidies, while we observe GATT
members reducing tari¤s.34 One typical way to avoid the problem is to assume away export
subsidies, but such an approach is not feasible here because we want to study the motivation
for the ban on export subsidies. Instead we build on the following lemma which argues that
countries will unilaterally choose export subsidies below a certain bound.
Lemma 2. Consider arbitrary import tari¤ policies and entry subsidies, and export sub-




ds = 0 Then s   and s   .
33The joint objectives are also maximized with trade subsidies in the monopolistic competition model of
Bagwell and Staiger (2009). Other trade policy models (e.g. Bagwell and Staiger 1999) allow the possibility
that political preferences result in positive cooperative net trade barriers. Appendix Section F.2 considers an
extension with two di¤erentiated sectors that can generate positive net trade barriers due to a distributional
conict.
34See Maggi and Rodridguez-Clare (2005) for more focus on this feature of trade policy models and an




is the value to governments of an additional unit of rm output. When subsidies
are greater than 

, the increase in subsidy costs cannot possibly be worth the increase in
output.35
Lemma 2 implies that countries would not choose export subsidies above these bounds
unless either they were constrained to do so, or if choosing an export subsidy above 

allowed them to choose a more desirable import policy or entry subsidy policy against some
constraint. We do not consider any such constraints in this chapter, so throughout we assume
s  

and s  

. The assumption allows us to derive later results without concern for
suboptimal subsidy choices.
Ruling out the possibility of high subsidies yields an empirically sensible result on import
tari¤s.




< 0 and dG
d < 0). If home and foreign choose noncooperative import tari¤s to
maximize their objectives, holding other policies xed, then the noncooperative import tari¤s
are higher than the cooperative import tari¤s that maximize W .
A foreign import tari¤ raises the equilibrium price of home exports in the foreign market,
and the higher price leads to lower exports for home. Provided that export subsidies do
not violate the bound suggested by Lemma 2, such that the subsidy is larger than the
governments valuation of export prots, then the import tari¤s always exert negative cross-
border externalities. The persistent negative externalities ensure that countriesunilateral
tari¤ choices are too high.
35The export subsidy increase consists of both an increase in the subsidy cost on the inframarginal export
volume, and the total subsidy cost on the marginal export units. The former has a negative e¤ect on
the government objective. When the subsidy is greater than  , the latter more than o¤sets the value to
governments of the marginal unit of output. The export subsidy has no e¤ect on the domestic market.
Consequently, countries cannot unilaterally benet from subsidies greater than  .
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1.3.4. Foreign Firm Entry Externalities
All policies create international externalities. We focus here on the externalities of a foreign
entry subsidy policy on home and postpone the discussion of trade policy externalities. We
show that foreign entry improves home di¤erentiated sector consumption but worsens home
domestic and foreign prots. Foreign entry improves homes net trade revenue when home
uses import tari¤s and export subsidies. The balance of concerns determines the e¤ect of
foreign entry on welfare.
Foreign entry lowers the price indices of the variety-loving consumers everywhere. An
elasticity of substitution  closer to 1 implies a larger e¤ect. We express results as log
derivatives: bybx  d ln yd lnx = dydx xy , the elasticity of y with respect to x.
(1.15) Consumer surplus e¤ect   
bPcnf = (1  S)(   1) > 0.
Here S  nhpch
nhpch+nfpf cf
, homes ratio of domestic expenditure on di¤erentiated products to
total expenditure on di¤erentiated products. S is foreigns ratio. Since consumer surplus is
inversely proportional to the price indices, the increase implies an increase in home consumer
surplus from consuming di¤erentiated products. The foreign price index increase is cP cnf =
 S
( 1) < 0.
Foreign entry unambiguously lowers home total and per-rm prots, both domestically
and abroad. A larger elasticity of substitution  implies a larger business-stealing e¤ect.
(1.16) Domestic prot e¤ect 
\( ch
xh
)hcnf = bchcnf = bPcnf (   ") =  (1  S)(   1) (   ") < 0.
(1.17) Export prot e¤ect 
\(1  ch
xh
)hcnf = bchcnf = cP cnf (   ") =   S

(   1)(   ") < 0.
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Foreign entry increases the total home import volume (but decreases the imports per-
rm). Foreign entry decreases the home export volume M and ch: A larger elasticity of
substitution implies a larger decrease in per rm volumes. Throughout when describing the
e¤ects, we assume  > 0 and s > 0.
(1.18) Import tari¤ revenue e¤ect  \pnfcfcnf = 1 + bcfcnf = 1  (   ")(   1)(1  S) > 0.
(1.19) Export subsidy cost e¤ect 
\ spnhchcnf =   bchcnf = (   ")(   1)(S) > 0.
The foreign rm entry has no external e¤ect on the home domestic entry subsidy costs
and labor income.
To summarize, the signs of the various e¤ects of foreign rm entry on the home govern-
ments objective are:
 Domestic prots decrease ( )
 Export prots decrease ( )
 Export subsidy costs decrease (+)
 Import tari¤ revenue increases (+)
 Consumer surplus increases (+)
The balance of the various externalities determines whether home benets from foreign
entry, and we will show in the next subsection that the sign is what matters for whether
countries would benet from subsidy rules. Like the cross-border trade policy e¤ects derived
in Lemma 1, the sign of the various rm entry externalities do not depend on the entry
subsidies and rm counts, provided that countries are symmetric. The desired international
regulation of entry subsidy depends entirely on how parameters and trade policy choices a¤ect
the reaction curves for each country. The level of the noncooperative and e¢ cient number
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of rms is irrelevant for determining the balance of the various externalities. Consequently,
we do not need to specify a specic functional form for the rm count cost function f(n)
nor do we need to solve for the noncooperative or cooperative choices of n in determining
whether subsidy rules are desirable.
1.3.5. GATT Domestic Policy Rules
This subsection formalizes the GATT domestic policy rules and the question of whether
further subsidy rules can o¤er an improvement. We consider whether the GATT approach
to international regulation of domestic policies36 succeeds in eliminating any domestic policy
externalities derived in the previous subsection. We would expect the GATT approach to
eliminate at least some domestic policy externalities, since the GATT eliminates all domestic
cross-border externalities in Bagwell and Staiger (2001a). We generalize their stylized model
of the GATT Article XXIII nonviolation complaint. As explained in Section 1.2.1, such a
constraint prevents countries from using domestic policies to undermine the benets implied
by tari¤ negotiations. The nonviolation complaint enables home to demand a rebalancing of
foreigns policies if foreigns domestic policy choices undermine the benet of tari¤ reductions
to home. Foreign would have to grant an additional tari¤ cut to home in order to abide by
Article XXIII.
We use the following denition to model Article XXIII:
Denition 4. A foreign policy mix ( ; s,e) is market-access preserving relative
to baseline policies ( ,s,e;  ; s,e) if and only if the new foreign policy mix yields equal or
greater home export volume relative to the baseline policies.
The denition must be di¤erent from Bagwell and Staiger (2001a) because theirs is not
well-dened in our framework. When Bagwell and Staiger (2001a) formalize their market
36There are also other domestic policy rules in GATT that we abstract from, such as National Treatment,
considered by Horn, Maggi, and Staiger (2010).
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access constraint (p. 547), they require that foreign policies would preserve or increase home
exports at a particular baseline world price. Their denition species nothing with respect
to homes policies, because homes export volume does not depend on homes policies apart
from the world price of homes exports, whereas in our framework the home export volume
also depends on the home entry subsidy.37 Foreign policies satisfying our denition do not
erode home export volume, holding the home entry subsidy and both world prices xed, so
policies satisfying our denition satisfy their denition augmented by the requirement that
the home entry subsidy is xed at the baseline level.
Building on our denition of market-access preserving, we have our model of the GATT.
Denition 5. Dene a GATT equilibrium to be a set of policies (^ ,s^,e^,^ ,s^,e^) such
that each country is choosing unilaterally optimal policies subject to the market access
constraint dened in the program below. The home and foreign constraints that imply a
GATT equilibrium are known as aGATT Agreement. Formally, the foreign policies satisfy
(^ ; s^; e^) = arg max
;s;e
G(^ ; s^; e^;  ; s; e)
subject to ch(^ ; s^; e^; 
; s; e)  ch(^ ; s^; e^; ^ ; s^; e^)
The set of GATT equilibria includes potential outcomes under GATT rules. For a given
equilibrium, foreign cannot reduce homes exports. One GATT equilibrium is at the fully
noncooperative trade policies. Tari¤reductions under GATT are a movement between GATT
equilibria.
To be consistent with reality, we need to ensure that if countries transition from one
GATT equilibrium to a second GATT equilibrium with constraints requiring greater market
access, then the second GATT equilibrium will have lower import tari¤s then the rst. In
other words, countries will lower tari¤s as part of granting each other greater market access.
37The home import tari¤ does not matter for home export volume, and the home export subsidy does not
have any e¤ect on home export volume apart from the world price.
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Countries could conceivably expand market access by reducing the entry subsidy and leaving
tari¤s xed. In particular, we want to consider a GATT equilibrium with zero import tari¤s,
because we derive results at a zero-tari¤GATT equilibrium in Section 1.4.1. We require the
following lemma:
Lemma 6. There exists a set B of scale parameters  for the function k(e); such that
there exists a GATT equilibrium at zero import tari¤s when  2 B.
We assume throughout that  2 B so a zero-tari¤ GATT equilibrium exists. The as-
sumption ensures that a su¢ cient expansion of market access under GATT rules eliminates
import tari¤s.
Our stylized model of GATT perfectly enforcing Article XXIII is unrealistic, but ap-
propriate for our purposes. As discussed in Section 1.2.1, the early history of the GATT
provides strong support for such a model, in the sense that countries understood that Article
XXIII could be used to prevent nations from undermining the market access granted by tari¤
cuts. Later rounds of negotiations suggest that Article XXIII was not as successful as GATT
drafters originally had hoped, and the number of successful Article XXIII complaints was
limited. When the Uruguay Round subsidy negotiations began in 1987, among the subsidies
that were considered "hardly enforceable" were domestic subsidies to import-competing in-
dustries that Article XXIII could have addressed (GATT document W-4). The focus of the
current chapter, however, is on why limits on subsidies were extended to trade-promoting
subsidies not limited by Article XXIII, so we take an ideal version of Article XXIII as given.
With our denition of a GATT agreement, we can consider formally whether an agree-
ment would benet from further subsidy restrictions.
Denition 7. Subsidy limits e  ~e and e  ~e or s  ~s and s  ~s improve a
GATT equilibrium if Nash equilibrium government choices subject to both the market access
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constraints and subsidy limits yield a superior joint government outcome relative to Nash
equilibrium choices subject only to the market access constraints.
This denition only considers two possible forms of agreements, market access constraints
and subsidy limits. Market access constraints alone can ensure e¢ ciency in the two-good
perfectly competitive framework of Bagwell and Staiger (2001a), who consider a generic
domestic policy whose only cross-border e¤ects travel through world prices. Subsidy limits
would never improve an agreement in such an environment.38
We next consider whether the GATT eliminates all domestic policy externalities. Con-
sider a GATT equilibrium. The GATT market access constraint binds, because otherwise it
would not prevent countries from choosing unilateral import tari¤s. Subsidy limits improve
the GATT equilibrium if there exists a combination of entry subsidy decreases and tari¤
increases along the market access constraint such that both countries are better o¤. For-
mally, such a combination exists when dG
dnf
jdch=0 < 0, such that an increase in foreign rms
(dnf) combined with a foreign tari¤ decrease keeps home exports constant (dch = 0).
39 For-
eigns constrained maximization implies dG

dnf




Among the foreign rm entry externalities from Subsection 1.2.4, the rst-order e¤ect
of foreign rm entry on home exports and export subsidy costs are zeroed out by the tari¤
change required to preserve home exports. GATT e¤ectively eliminates the home export
e¤ect and the export subsidy cost e¤ect. Three other cross-border e¤ects of foreign rm
entry remain:
38The limits on contract type in the current paper di¤er from a literature that focuses on e¢ cient points
achieved when countries act as if they do not value their ability to manipulate their terms-of-trade. Bagwell
and Staiger (2009) determine an e¢ cient point in a monopolistically competitive framework that involves
high export subsidies and noncooperative import tari¤s. Such a point is an infeasible outcome in the
current papers contracting environment, because countries would unilaterally deviate by cutting their export
subsidies. Contracting over a minimum export subsidy level would allow the point to be maintained, but no
such policy exists in the GATT/WTO.
39The foreign tari¤ decrease that keeps home export constant is  d dch=ddch=dnf .
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 Domestic prots ( )
 Consumer surplus (+)
 Import tari¤ revenue (+)
Which of the three e¤ects above dominate depends on the parameters and trade policies
in later sections. The complexity here contrasts with Bagwell and Staiger (2001a), where all
three e¤ects are a function of the terms-of-trade, and countries prefer terms-of-trade gains
by assumption.
To interpret the result, notice that the foreign entry subsidy promotes both exports and
import competition, the former trade-promoting and the latter trade-reducing. The GATT
market access constraint eliminates the trade-reducing and import-competing e¤ects of the
subsidy and leaves only the trade-promoting e¤ects. The remaining externalities are similar
to the externalities of export subsidies.
Throughout this chapter, we will make heavy use of the following lemma:
Lemma 8. Consider a set a constraints X = 0. Adding entry subsidy limits to the
set of constraints improves a GATT equilibrium subject to the set of constraints X = 0 if
dG
dnf
jdX=0 < 0. Adding export subsidy limits improves the GATT equilibrium if dGds jdX=0 < 0.
To apply Lemma 8 to the GATT equilibrium with a market access constraint, we need
to argue that the market access constraint binds. When market access is bound below the
Nash level, then the market access constraint binds, because home wants to raise its tari¤
(dG
d
> 0 as shown in the proof of Lemma 3). At the Nash equilibrium, the market access
constraint binds by denition.
Applying the Lemma 8, subsidy limits improve a GATT equilibrium subject to the market
access constraint, if the sum of the domestic prot e¤ect, the import tari¤ revenue e¤ect,
and the consumer surplus e¤ect is negative.
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1.4. Model of Subsidy Rule Evolution
This section models subsidy rule evolution by applying the two-country framework in-
troduced in the previous section. At a GATT equilibrium (dened in Denition 5), then the
equilibrium could be improved by adding subsidy limits (Denition 7) when import tari¤s
are close to zero. Three characteristics that motivate subsidy limits are a high government
weight on domestic prots, a high substitutability between home and foreign goods, and a
large share of di¤erentiated goods consumed domestically. When tari¤s are close to nonco-
operative tari¤ levels, the agreement cannot be improved by adding subsidy limits. While
the rst two subsections establish the evolution results for the domestic subsidy policy, the
third subsection extends the results to the export subsidy. The results link the evolution of
subsidy rules to tari¤ reductions. The fourth subsection considers how countervailing duty
laws can be used as a substitute for subsidy limits in some cases, and the nal subsection
argues that in a three-country extension, subsidy limits can be valuable when countervailing
duties are di¢ cult to coordinate.
This section takes the choice among the GATT equilibria to be exogenous. We have
shown in Lemmas 3 and 6 that a GATT equilibrium at zero import tari¤s exists that is
Pareto superior to the noncooperative equilibrium. We can then explore within the context
of the model the subsidy rule consequences of an exogenous import tari¤ reduction, one
that parallels the signicant drop in import tari¤s between the GATT and the WTO. This
dissertation does not provide a theory explaining why countries chose a GATT equilibrium
with higher tari¤s in the 1940s and progressed to Pareto superior GATT equilibria with
lower tari¤s, but there is already a large literature on theories of gradual tari¤ reductions.40
40See Bagwell and Staiger (2002, p. 106-107) and Bagwell and Staiger (2010) for surveys.
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1.4.1. Subsidy Limits at Zero Tari¤s
This subsection rst establishes the possibility that subsidy limits could improve a GATT
equilibrium in the simplest case when import tari¤s are zero. We then establish a more
general set of parameters such that subsidy limits improve the GATT equilibrium.
Consider a GATT equilibrium such that the resulting policies are zero import tari¤s
^ = ^  = 0. Such an agreement exists (Lemma 6). If a unilateral increase in entry subsidies
and decrease in import tari¤s, holding the trading partners export volume xed, still results
in a negative net cross-border externality, then constraining subsidies would improve the
GATT equilibrium. The negative net cross-border externality results if the negative e¤ect
on domestic prots outweighs the positive e¤ect on consumers (Lemma 8), given that there
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The sign of dG
dnf
jdch=0 is the same as the bracketed expression. Foreign entry decreases
the home price index. The price index change leads to an increase in consumer surplus
(with unit elasticity) and fall in domestic prots (with elasticity (  ")). For a government
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maximizing national income with  = 1, the home price index decrease from foreign home
entry is always desirable. If government weighs domestic prots heavily (high ), the price














Though S is endogenous, for symmetric policies and zero tari¤s the market share depends
only on parameters: S = ch
ch+(1+)cf
= 1
1+(1+)1  . We then have an expression for the
existence of trade-rules in terms of parameters. The rst proposition then follows from
(1.22) and Lemma 8:




there exists a GATT equilibrium at su¢ ciently low
import tari¤s that can be improved by limits on domestic entry subsidies.
The theory implies three considerations that can motivate a GATT equilibrium limiting
entry subsidies:
(1) high political economy weight on prots (high ), which raises subsidies cross-
border externality on prots,
(2) high domestic share of consumption (high S and high ), which increases the relative
importance of domestic prots compared to consumer surplus, and
(3) high substitutability between di¤erentiated goods relative to the outside good (low
"

), which increases the e¤ects of competition from foreign entrants.
The proposition implies subsidy limits can improve a GATT equilibrium given reasonable




, the ratio of elasticities of substitution between the highest and
lowest categories of goods in Table IV of Broda and Weinstein (2006), and the share of
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di¤erentiated consumption is 75%, then we require a > 2, which implies governments give
more weight to lobbying contributions than national welfare.41
1.4.2. No Subsidy Limits at Higher Tari¤s
This subsection establishes that when countries choose noncooperative tari¤s, subsidy limits
cannot improve a GATT equilibrium. We show that at noncooperative tari¤s, in contrast
to the zero-tari¤ case, countries must benet from a price index decrease. Since foreign
rm entry decreases the price index and increases import tari¤ revenue, countries always
benet from foreign subsidies. The theory then provides a link between the import tari¤
reductions of the 1950s and 1960s under the GATT and the addition of subsidy limits on
domestic trade-promoting subsidies under the WTO.42 To derive these results, a helpful form
of notation to introduce is the partial e¤ect of the home price index on government welfare,
as function of the home tari¤  . The notation has suppressed the dependence of GP on the
other policies:











The Nash equilibrium import tari¤ condition dG
d
= 0 can be written as
GP (
N) =  D.
This restatement of the noncooperative tari¤ condition reects the tradeo¤ countries face
when raising the import tari¤. The tari¤ increase causes the price index to rise to the detri-
ment of home, but it also leads to a gain in homes import tari¤ revenue on the inframarginal
41For a formal estimation of government weights on prots, Mitra, Thomakos, and Ulubasoglu (2006) nd
close to equal weight on contributions and consumer welfare, while the earliest studies found little weight
on contributions (Goldberg and Maggi 1999, Gawande and Bandyopadhyay 2000). The estimates are for a
di¤erent model (Grossman and Helpman 1994) with perfectly competitive sectors.
42The relevance of the result does not rest on the claim that the GATT actually represented a fall from
noncooperative tari¤s to zero import tari¤s, since the respective results for zero and noncooperative import
tari¤s each hold for some neighborhood around the respective tari¤ choices.
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imports. For the Nash import tari¤ condition to hold, GP (N) < 0 must hold. In contrast,
when we derived parameter conditions under which countries desired subsidy rules in the
previous subsection, we required the equivalent of GP (0) > 0, so home government actually
prefers a price index increase. At the Nash equilibrium, the foreign rm entry externality










+ Npcf , and





> 0. An increase in foreign rm entry can be decomposed into two e¤ects: a
decrease in the price index and an increase in import tari¤ revenue. At the Nash equilibrium,
import tari¤s are positive and the home government prefers a marginal decrease in the price
index, so the externality of foreign rm entry is positive. The positive sign of the foreign
rm entry at Nash tari¤s implies, by Lemma 8, the following proposition:
Proposition 10. The GATT equilibrium at noncooperative tari¤s cannot be improved
by subsidy limits on domestic policies.
The results here are similar to prior work on subsidy agreements at noncooperative
tari¤s. The Bagwell and Staiger (2006) study of subsidy rules uses a two-good perfectly
competitive economy. In such an environment, Bagwell and Staiger (1999) have shown that
a country sets the relative local price of its import good to its export good to be higher
than it would otherwise prefer, because the import tari¤ improves its terms-of-trade. With
standard preferences, this terms-of-trade improvement is reected in higher tari¤ revenue
on the inframarginal import volume, as in this chapter. When foreign then imposes an
export subsidy at the Nash equilibrium, home benets from both the decrease in price of
the imported good,and the improvement in its terms of trade. A similar case occurs under
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monopolistic competition in Bagwell and Staiger (2009). In their analysis, import tari¤s
have no terms-of-trade e¤ects, and at Nash import tari¤s, countries do not value any change
in their local price. When a foreign country imposes an export subsidy, there is no e¤ect on
home welfare through the change in local price, but home still benets from the terms-of-
trade gain. The foreign entry subsidy e¤ects in this chapter are distinct from the prior work,
because the foreign entry subsidy leads to a desirable decrease in the price index and no
terms-of-trade e¤ects, while Bagwell and Staiger (2006, 2009) model foreign subsidies that
improve homes terms of trade. Yet the result is similar to prior work in that the Nash tari¤
condition pins down the partial e¤ect of local prices on the government objective, and the
local price e¤ect implies that countries benet from a foreign subsidy.
Though this chapter matches prior work on the lack of motive for subsidy rules at non-
cooperative import policies, the chapter is still distinct in showing that political economy
motives can motivate subsidy rules away from the Nash tari¤s. It is interesting to consider
further why the claim that higher  can motivate subsidy rules does not continue to apply
at noncooperative import policies, as we have already proven in Proposition 10.






Consumer Surplus E¤ectz }| {
 PD
bPcnf +












 1CCCA 1nf .
The connection between the motive to limit subsidies and the motive to raise tari¤s is evident









bchbpf + Npnfcf bcfbpf = 0.
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Hidden within the unilateral tari¤ condition is the result that the fall in consumer surplus
from an increased tari¤ is perfectly o¤set by the rst-order increase in tari¤ revenue. Uni-
lateral tari¤s are always positive: a foreign price increase raises home per rm sales (chcpf > 0)
and lowers foreign import sales ( bcfcpf < 0) A higher political economy motivation (higher )
motives higher import tari¤s. Those larger import tari¤s are su¢ ciently large so that the
import tari¤ revenue e¤ect and consumer surplus e¤ect always dominate the domestic prot
e¤ect. The following is then an alternative Proposition 10 proof, which unpacks the various
e¤ects that operate through the home price index.
To connect the unilateral import tari¤equation to the cross-border externality expression,
we require a relationship between the e¤ect of foreign prices on domestic consumption and
the e¤ect of foreign entry on domestic consumption. Log di¤erentiating the demand equation
(1.8) and price index equation (1.6) establishes the relationship. A one percent foreign price
increase has the same impact on homes price index as a (   1) percent decrease in foreign
rms: (1   ) bPcnf = bPcpf . Consequently, the impact of a one percent foreign rm increase on
expenditure of either home or foreign goods is the same as the impact of a (   1) percent
decrease in foreign rms: \nfpf cfcnf = (1   ) \nfpf cfcpf and \nhpchcnf = (1   )\nhpchcpf . The expressions











We can then substitute the Nash tari¤condition into the foreign rm externality equation.




















where SN is homes import share at the Nash equilibrium. For the foreign rm entry exter-
nality to be negative, and the subsidy limits to be desirable, the bracketed expression must














But our parameter restriction requires  < . The parameter restriction was necessary be-
cause without it, governments would achieve an arbitrarily high joint objective by providing
boundless export subsidies to their rms. The import tari¤ e¤ect is strong enough to remove
any motive to constrain the entry subsidies.
1.4.3. Extending Results to Export Subsidies
This subsection extends the results of the previous two subsections on entry-promoting sub-
sidies to export subsidies a¤ecting marginal cost of production. We desire such an extension
to explain why there was a consensus to limit both domestic policies and export subsidies
in the WTO.
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Import Tari¤ Revenue E¤ectz }| {
pnfcf
 bcfbpf
 1CCCA 11 + +  + s .
Notice the similarities between the expression, (1.20), and (1.24). We do not require notation
to indicate the e¤ects of a GATT equilibrium because the GATT equilibrium does not
constrain export subsidies. Because dG
ds
= 0 at the GATT equilibrium, dG
ds =
dW
ds , so it is
su¢ cient to show that dG
ds < 0 to establish that export subsidies are ine¢ ciently high and
countries would benet from export subsidy limits.
The condition for the domestic prot e¤ect to dominate the consumer surplus here is
equivalent to the condition for domestic entry subsidies at zero tari¤s in Section 1.4.1. The
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conditions are equivalent because of the close relationship between foreign price e¤ects and
foreign rm entry e¤ects: (1  ) bPcnf = bPcpf and chcnf = (1  )chcpf . Consequently, the motive for
subsidy limits at zero tari¤s holds for either kind of trade-promoting subsidy.
At Nash import tari¤s, the import tari¤ revenue e¤ect precisely o¤sets the domestic
prot e¤ect, as evident from (1.25), and all that remains is the consumer surplus benet for
the falling foreign price. The result that dG
ds ==N > 0 at the Nash equilibrium implies










1 + +  + s
> 0.
By Lemma 8,we can state the following:
Proposition 11. Propositions 9 and 10 extend to export subsidies.
Proposition 11 completes our explanation for why the rationale for subsidy limits and
their evolution applies to both domestic entry subsidies and export subsidies.
1.4.4. Countervailing Duties
The previous subsections have considered how countries can improve upon GATT rules by
bounding subsidies at cooperative levels. An alternative way to ensure e¢ cient subsidies is
by permitting a countervailing duty response to a subsidy. We show that if countries impose
duties such that they eliminate the negative policy externalities of the subsidies, then the
duties can ensure e¢ cient subsidy choices. If  satises the conditions laid out in Proposition
9 so there is a problem with subsidies being too high in the absence of more rules, then
countries can achieve e¢ cient policies using countervailing duties instead of subsidy limits
at the zero-tari¤ equilibrium. The evolution story described in the previous subsection
still holds: since countries are already choosing their best response import tari¤s at the
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Nash equilibrium, countries obviously cannot achieve greater cooperation with countervailing
duties at the Nash equilibrium.
To model these issues we introduce the following extension of our prior denition of the
GATT equilibrium:
Denition 12. Dene a GATT equilibrium with countervailing duties to be a set
of policies (^ ,s^,e^,^ ,s^,e^) such that each country is choosing unilaterally optimal policies
subject to the market access constraint dened in the program below, and such that any
subsidy that undermines a trading partners domestic sales is mechanically met with an
import tari¤ ( for home) that restores domestic sales volume to the baseline level. The home
and foreign constraints that imply a GATT equilibrium are known as a GATT agreement
with countervailing duties. Formally, the foreign policies satisfy
(^ ; s^; e^) = arg max
;s;e
G( ; s^;e^;  ; s; e)
subject to ch(^ ; s^; e^; 
; s; e)  ch(^ ; s^; e^; ^ ; s^; e^)
and ch( ; s^;e^;  ; s; e) = ch(^ ; s^; e^; ^
; s^; e^)
A GATT equilibrium with countervailing duties is one where countries would not deviate
from a baseline level of subsidization given that a subsidy will be met with a countervailing
duty response from the trading partner that preserves the trading partners domestic sales,
and as in the earlier GATT equilibrium denition, the subsidy also requires an import
tari¤ reduction that preserves the trading partners export volume. The maximum level of
countervailing duty implied by the denition is consistent with practice under the WTO.
For an export subsidy, the countervailing duty (   ^ , the tari¤ in excess of the baseline
41
rate) that satises the second constraint above equals the amount of export subsidy beyond
the baseline rate (s   s^). The laws for a countervailing duty of a nonrecurring subsidy
are less straightforward. As Grossman and Mavroidis (2003) detail, one interpretation is
that the countervailing duty should undo the e¤ect of the undesirable subsidy, and such a
requirement is met here.
We also introduce the following formalism that parallels Section 1.3.5:
Denition 13. Subsidy limits e  ~e and e  ~e or s  ~s and s  ~s improve a
GATT equilibrium with countervailing duties if Nash equilibrium government choices subject
to both the market access constraints, the countervailing duties, and the subsidy limits yield
a superior joint government outcome relative to Nash equilibrium choices subject only to the
market access constraints and countervailing duties.
We prove that the zero-tari¤ GATT equilibrium (which exists by Lemma 6) with coun-
tervailing duties cannot be improved by subsidy limits. Recall from Section 1.4.2 that the









Because a countervailing duty that preserves home domestic sales also preserves the
home price index, we have GP dPdnf term is eliminated for any di¤erential increase in the entry








> 0 for  > 0. We can
then decompose any discrete increase in foreign entry into an integral over such di¤erential
increases in the subsidies, and conclude that the discrete increase in foreign entry must have
a nonnegative e¤ect on home government welfare. We then have the following proposition
by Lemma 8:
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Proposition 14. A GATT equilibrium with countervailing duties at non-negative import
tari¤s cannot be improved by subsidy limits.
The success of countervailing duties then begs the question of why countries would ever
have subsidy limits in addition to countervailing duties. One explanation, discussed in the
next subsection, is the potential for subsidies to create problems for countries competing
in third markets. Another answer we discuss here is that countervailing duties could deter
e¢ cient subsidization.














< 0. By smooth concavity there must exist a level of subsidies within the










which case a country would be deterred from an e¢ cient level of subsidization. The GATT
equilibrium with subsidy limits does not su¤er the same problem in theory. We can then
state the following proposition:
Proposition 15. If countries must transition from an ine¢ cient level of subsidies to an
e¢ cient level of subsidies, then there exist points that can be obtained by the GATT equilib-
rium with subsidy limits than cannot be obtained by the GATT equilibrium with countervailing
duties.
1.4.5. Third Country Competition
As we discussed in Section 1.2.2, a reason why countries would favor using subsidy limits
over countervailing duties is competition in third countries. The case for using subsidy limits
in a three-country scenario in this model depends on the di¢ culty of countries coordinating
countervailing duty action. The baseline model can easily be extended to a third symmetric
country. Here we consider a scenario where home can impose a countervailing duty on
foreigns entry subsidy, but the third country exogenously does not impose a countervailing
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duty on foreign. We denote the third countrys production with subscript g and also use the
superscript g to denote nal destination and government choices of the third country. We
already discussed in the previous subsection how at zero tari¤s, there is no rst-order e¤ect
of foreign subsidization on home, without considering the third country e¤ects. The only
e¤ect of the foreign subsidy on home via the third country is through the change in the third





















> 0 because an increase in the third-country price index is a decrease
in foreign competition and improved exports, and by Lemma 2, and we know that s < 

,
because countries will never subsidize exports so much that they would prefer a decrease
in export volume. Consequently, GP g > 0, so countries benet from an increase in the




< 0. Intuitively, the home government is worse o¤ in the third market because the
increased foreign competition has an adverse e¤ect on its exports.
The e¤ect of foreign entry on the third country is equal to the e¤ect of foreign entry
on home derived in Equation (1.21). The third country su¤ers from the entry subsidy and
does not impose the countervailing duty. There is no e¤ect on the third countrys exports
to home because homes countervailing duty preserves homes price index.
The Lemma 8 result, that a negative externality implies countries benet from subsidy
rules, can easily be extended from two countries to the three-country setting. We have shown
that both home and the third country su¤er a negative e¤ect from foreign rm entry. Subject
to the market access and countervailing duty constraints, foreign sets its policy so there is
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no rst-order e¤ect of a change in entry subsidy. By setting a subsidy limit below the foreign
level absent any such limit, home and the third country gain a rst-order benet and the
world objective improves. We then have the following proposition:
Proposition 16. In a three-country economy, a GATT equilibrium with home counter-
vailing duties at zero import tari¤s can be improved by subsidy limits.
Having considered this result, we also need to verify that by including a third country,
we have not overturned our previous result that subsidy rules are undesirable at the Nash
policy choices. This result, which we leave to Appendix D, is that subsidy rules are desirable
when political economy incentives are su¢ ciently weak:
Proposition 17. In the three-country economy, homes welfare cannot be improved from






This upper bound of  in Proposition 17 is greater than the lower bound of  in Propo-
sition 9 that ensured countries desired subsidy limits, because " > 1.
It is worth discussing why there are potentially some  where home would want subsidy
agreements in the three-country case and not in the two-country case. When foreign sub-
sidizes in the two-country case, the nonviolation complaint protects home from losing any
exports to foreign, and home has set import tari¤s su¢ ciently high so that home benets
from the price index decrease. In the three-country case, home is still worse o¤ from the
foreign subsidy decreasing the third countrys price index, and political economy motives
could allow the third-country e¤ect to dominate in theory.
Using the parameter values from Section 1.4.1, the  upper bound is 8, far larger than
any estimated in the published empirical literature, so the theory is still consistent with the
stylized fact that there are no subsidy rules at noncooperative tari¤s.
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1.5. Conclusion
This chapter counters the claim that the WTO subsidy rules have no economic rationale
whatsoever. It resolves the puzzle of why countries would seek to constrain trade-reducing
policies at the time of the GATT, yet implement barriers to trade-promoting policies 40
years later. The model is highly stylized, but it is important to provide a simple theory
for understanding the WTO subsidy rules, when such a large body of literature argues the
subsidy rules are nonsensical. Much of the trade literature argues that the GATT struck the
right balance in regulating both trade policies and domestic policies, but the current chapter
argues that the world trading system has faced problems that the GATT could not address.
The model provides a positive theory for the WTO subsidy rules. From the normative
perspective that countries should maximize national income, the model does not provide a
result distinct from prior work, since there is no motive for subsidy rules absent political
economy motives. The positive theory is still valuable in explaining why countries form sub-
optimal agreements. If there are additional reasons why governments should value domestic
production outside the scope of the model, then this chapter is a step towards a model of
how such considerations would be important in motivating subsidy rules.
While we have mainly considered the history of domestic policies in manufacturing trade
to validate the theory, the negotiations over services provide an additional potential appli-
cation. As Francois and Hoekman (2010) observe, a puzzle in the services trade literature is
that trade liberalization has tended to be unilateral and not driven by trade agreements
actual services policies are more liberal than negotiated policy bounds. The authors remark,
"Much more work is also required to understand the political economy of services policies
and reform. It is not clear that for international transactions that involve factor movement
(i.e. trade in service) the standard explanations in the literature rst and foremost the
terms of trade rationale necessarily apply." Another dening feature of services trade is
that domestic regulations rather than border measures are what matter for market access,
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so the framework developed here is promising for the analysis of such trade barriers. The
theory can explain why services liberalization would be unilateral in some industries but
require coordination in others.
This chapter improves our positive understanding of the international coordination of
subsidies, but the actual decision-making process to le subsidy disputes and countervailing
duties is more complex than in the model. How does the political process map the winners
and losers from subsidization into the actual decision-making? To what extent do bureaucrats
have the necessary information to make appropriate decisions about subsidies? More research
is necessary to understand how international coordination of subsidies could be improved,




International Competition Policy and the 1948 Havana Charter
2.1. Introduction
An important question in the economics of the multilateral trading system is whether
countries should negotiate directly over specic behind-the-border domestic policies, i.e.
achieve "deep" integration. Beginning in 1947, the world trading system was governed
by the General Agreement on Tari¤s and Trade (GATT), which achieved only "shallow"
integration. Domestic policies were constrained only to the extent that they undermined
the benets of negotiated tari¤ commitments. This GATT treatment of domestic policies
is consistent with the terms-of-trade theory of trade agreements. The theory establishes
that if the only motive for a trade agreement is to prevent countries from using policy
choices to manipulate their terms of trade, then shallow integration is su¢ cient to achieve an
e¢ cient trade agreement (Bagwell and Staiger 2001a). Although the terms-of-trade theory is
consistent with the GATTs shallow integration, progress towards deep integration should not
be necessary under the terms-of-trade theory. In 1948, 53 nations signed the Havana Charter
intending to create the International Trade Organization (ITO), which was to be the third
pillar of the global economic order along with the World Bank and International Monetary
Fund (IMF). A guiding principle of the Havana Charter was that global integration required
agreements covering more than traditional trade instruments. The ITO had the support
of the Truman Administration that negotiated the Charter, but the Charter faced so much
resistance from Congress that it was never put up for a vote.
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The history of international coordination in competition policy raises a number of ques-
tions. Why did countries agree to support the 1948 Havana Charter that included interna-
tional coordination of competition policy? Why did the WTO not include any competition
policy even though it included other forms of deep integration like the subsidy rules? How
is trade liberalization likely to a¤ect future coordination of competition policy? These ques-
tions are important to our understanding of agreements over behind-the-border domestic
policies.
This chapter proposes a model of competition policy coordination with symmetric coun-
tries. The executive has preferences in the reduced form of Baldwin (1987) and Grossman
and Helpman (1994) such that rm prots receive more weight than consumer welfare due
to political motives. The competition policy is modeled as governments directly choosing
the number of rms in a monopolistically competitive environment. Having governments
choose rms is standard practice in the international competition policy literature (Horn
and Levinsohn 2001, Ch. 9 of Bagwell and Staiger 2002), but usually in the context of
Cournot mergers. An advantage over the Cournot framework for the current exposition
is that the competition policies have no e¤ect on prices and create international problems
distinct from terms-of-trade problems.1
This chapters main result is that when trade barriers are high as in the 1940s, the
executive supports global coordination toward stronger competition policy. When countries
make their competition policy choices, they do not internalize the cross-border e¤ect on
consumer prots and foreign prots and tari¤ revenue. One countrys lax competition policy
(allowing less entry and competition) is good for foreign competitors but bad for foreign
consumers. The decision of Congress to reject the charter is not a focus of this chapter,
but this decision is most easily explained by party di¤erences, since the Democrats held the
executive while the Republicans captured Congress in 1946. It was the Republicans who
1Intuitively the lack of price e¤ects means these results cannot be given a terms-of-trade interpretation. A
full argument requires we consider a larger set of policies and is not worked out until the third chapter.
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imposed the infamous Smoot-Hawley tari¤s of 1930 and came close to blocking the 1945
renewal of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA) of 1945 that enabled GATT to be
implemented in 1947.
The chapter next considers the competition policy implications of the cooperation in
import tari¤ reduction since the 1940s. Since a cross-border e¤ect of strict competition
policy is to increase international trade subject to tari¤s, the tari¤ reductions can shift
the executives cross-border externalities from coordinating on stricter antitrust towards
coordination on no antitrust or lax antitrust, such that Congress will be even further in favor
of lax antitrust. The conclusion here mirrors that of the rst chapter of this dissertation on
subsidies: any eventual agreement on antitrust will result in lax antitrust that serves the
interests of rms to reduce foreign competition, much like the WTO agreement on subsidies
that actually occurred.
The results here contrast with a wide body of work that argues terms-of-trade manipu-
lation was the only relevant motive for a trade agreement in the rst decades of the GATT
and that no further agreements over domestic policies, including competition policies, should
be required. Irwin, Mavroidis, and Sykes (2008) nd the strongest support for the terms-
of-trade theory in explaining the negotiations that led to the GATT. Looking at a theory
of competition policy, Bagwell and Staiger (2002, Ch. 9) nd no advantage to contracting
directly over competition policy. Their results depend on the functioning of the GATT non-
violation complaint, which prevents countries from any change in the mix of competition
policy and tari¤s that undermines the market access commitments implied by import tari¤
reductions. Just as in this dissertations rst chapter, international externalities persist here
despite a functional GATT nonviolation complaint. There are still externalities from homes
competition policy choices in the foreign countrys domestic market, even if GATT rules
preserve the foreign countrys market access to home.
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Prot-shifting and political economy motives in this chapter are therefore important for
the multilateral trading systems treatment of behind-the-border policies. This consequence
contrasts with Antras and Staiger (2012, forthcoming), who argue that motives for deep in-
tegration did not arise until more recently, when o¤shoring emerged and bilateral bargaining
determined more international prices. The current chapter argues that international coor-
dination problems other than terms-of-trade manipulation mattered back when the GATT
was formed. Aside from the historical interest, prot-shifting and political economy motives
expand the set of questions that matter for determining the future of the WTO in regulating
domestic policies, as laid out in Staiger (2011).
The work most closely related to this chapter is Horn and Levinsohn (2001), which
considers whether supranational antitrust coordination is desirable in a Cournot framework
with homogeneous products. Their papers focus is more normative than positive and they
conclude that there are no general or intuitive results on supranational coordination. Horn
and Levinsohn do not consider the GATT nonviolation complaint and it is unclear what
international externalities persist in the Cournot setting when the nonviolation complaint is
e¤ective.
2.2. Historical Background
This section argues that despite the ultimate failure of the ITO, the negotiation of the
Havana Charter was an important example of domestic policy coordination. Negotiating the
Havana Charter was a signicant act between countries. It was proposed by John Maynard
Keynes of the United Kingdom and signed by the U.S., and the U.K. and U.S. were the
two major players in the trade negotiations at the time (Irwin, Mavroidis, and Sykes 2008).
A guiding principle of the Havana Charter was that global integration required agreements
covering more than traditional trade instruments. As Council of Foreign Relations economist
William Diebold (1993-94) reects,
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The ITOwas based on the conviction you could not maximize trade liberalization
or probably not achieve the objectives of the GATTby means of traditional
trade negotiations alone. . . [One] was to nd some way of relating the rules
of international trade to the domestic policies of a group of diverse coun-
tries.
The international coordination of competition policy (antitrust in the U.S.) was an im-
portant feature of the agreement, as negotiators believed it was the primary form of conict
between Congress and the Truman Administration. State department negotiator John M.
Leddy says the ITO charter would have moved foreign antitrust closer to U.S. levels, which
were the worlds strongest:
"We considered ourselves a model how the restraint-of-trade problem should
be handled. Cartels are to be outlawed, and the foreigners who sort of grew
up in a cartel atmosphere anyhow it was not their way of doing business
to outlaw cartels automatically.... It was a case-by-case procedure. The
ITO Charter was a compromise on this."2
The 1940s are likely as good time as any to apply a standard neoclassical trade pol-
icy model to government decision making, given the values of the U.S. State Department
following Cordell Hull.
Having been chosen by Roosevelt to serve as Secretary of State, Hull was
uniquely positioned to pursue his belief that freer trade might lead to eco-
nomic and political conditions that would be more favorable to peace. Hull
fought a long and hard bureaucratic battle to ensure that the o¢ cial U.S.
government position on international-trade policy was his State Depart-
ments vision of a world more open to trade and free from discriminatory
commercial policies.... Although Hull retired as Secretary of State in No-
vember 1944 and was not directly involved in the GATT [ITO] negotiations,
he gave the State Department a strong and lasting intellectual direction.
As Americas longest-serving secretary of state and imbued with a deep
ideological attachment to the reduction of trade barriers, Hull shaped the
State Departments approach to trade policy long after his departure.
The ITO had the strong support of the Truman Administration that negotiated the
Charter, but the Charter faced so much resistance from Congress that it was never put up
for a vote. The explanation with the strongest historical support is that Congress did not
2Oral History Interview with John M. Leddy by Richard D. McKenzie, 15 June 1973, available at
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/leddyj.htm (last visited 4 May 2012).
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believe that competition policy coordination was going to result in stronger global antitrust,
even though the Truman Administration insisted that was the case, based on the recollection
of State Department economist Leroy Stinebower:
"[The charter] led the opposition in the Congress at least to believe that we
were creating a supranational organization that could come into the United
States and control both our social and our antitrust laws. And the funny
thing is in part they saw it the other way around, These countries dont
have any very tough antitrust laws and theyll water ours down to the level
of theirs."3
This chapter does not have a model for why Congress would not trust the executives
prognosis of the policy coordination outcome. The chapter instead focuses on the decision
of the executive to negotiate the charter. Modelling the executives decision is a better t
for the framework we have already developed in the previous chapter.
2.3. Modeling Competition Policy
The model here follows the two-country, two factor model of the rst chapter, but we re-
interpret the domestic policy choice of the home country as being a competition policy rather
than a subsidy to rm entry. The reduced-form government competition policy directly
determines the competition policy at a cost f(n). Stronger enforcement of competition
policy is represented by more competition and more rms and a larger cost of enforcement.
What encompasses the policy of no intervention is not crucial for our analysis, as our main
focus is on whether government policy is relatively more pro-competitive or anti-competitive.
The range of policies also encompasses policies of restrictive competition, so a policy of no
government intervention is in the interior of the set of choices of n.
Modeling competition policy in such a reduced-form manner is a common feature of the
international competition policy literature, such as Horn and Levinsohn (2001) and Ch. 9
3Oral History Interview with Leroy Stinebower by Richard D. McKenzie, 9 June 1974, available at
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/stinebow.htm (last visited 4 May 2012).
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of Bagwell and Staiger (2002). Since this prior work used Cournot competition, we must
evaluate whether the model still makes sense in a monopolistically competitive setting.4
In our monopolistically competitive setting, reducing the number of rms reduces variety
and has no e¤ect on individual prices, but price indices rise, in contrast to the Cournot case,
in which quantity falls and prices rise. But unlike Cournot, the anti-competitive behavior
that arises here when government reduces the number of rms cannot be interpreted as looser
merger policy. Unlike Cournot, monopolistic competition lacks a conict between industry
producer surplus and social surplus. In a homogeneous product Cournot setting, producer
surplus is maximized by a monopolist, and social surplus is maximized as n approaches
innity. In our monopolistic competition model, both social surplus and industry prots
increase as n approaches innity.5 To resolve this issue, there could be additional costs
that are borne privately by the rm that are either not considered by the government or are
o¤set by positive externalities of entry, but such a change in the model would prevent us from
extending results from the rst chapter that involve home industries lobbying government
to increase entry and total industry prots.
Motives for anticompetitive behavioral can still arise at the level of any individual rm,
since any individual rms prot increases when the consumer price index increases. Govern-
ment policy can be interpreted as addressing the potential conicts that could arise between
the individual capital owners within a country, who are then also capable of banding together
and lobbying to limit competition from foreign rms.
4But do notice that the original Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) model adapted here was an application to an
industrial organization literature on e¢ cient entry.
5Though per rms sales are decreasing in n (n enters with exponent  "1  ), the total industry prots are
increasing in n (n enters with exponent " 1 1 > 0). See the rst appendix section on comparative statics.
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2.4. Coordination on Stronger Competition Policy
The result that countries would want to coordinate on stronger competition policy at
Nash equilibrium tari¤s is a corollary of our result from the rst chapter that countries
would want never want to coordinate on restricting subsidies at Nash equilibrium tari¤s.
In the rst chapter, we derived equation (1.24), which says that the external e¤ects of
foreign entry consist of a consumer surplus e¤ect, domestic prot e¤ect, and an import tari¤
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Substituting in the form for Nash tari¤s, we derived the e¤ect of foreign entry on home




















Corollary 18. The GATT equilibrium at noncooperative tari¤s can be improved by co-
ordinating on stronger competition policy.
Countries can then benet from coordinating on stronger competition policy because the
net cross-border externalities from strong competition policy are positive. The nature of the
competition policy externality is that it boosts consumer surplus and tari¤revenue by enough
to outweigh the negative cross-border e¤ect on rmsdomestic prots. The externality is
assured to be positive regardless of the strength of political economy because the political
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economy motive also leads countries to set higher import tari¤s, which o¤set the stronger
negative e¤ects of rm prots on the governments objective.
The result here contrasts with both Bagwell and Staiger (2002) and Horn and Levinsohn
(2001). In contrast to Bagwell and Staiger, there are externalities here from competition
policy that are not transmitted through terms of trade, so GATT nonviolation rules do not
eliminate competition policy. In contrast to Horn and Levinsohn (2001), this chapter gets a
result on supranational coordination by considering the case of Nash tari¤s, by considering
the nonviolation complaint, and by assuming a specic form of demand.
2.5. E¤ects of Trade Liberalization on Competition Policy Coordination
Absent a model, the contrasting histories of competition policy coordination and subsidy
coordination are puzzling. The 1948 Havana Charter included provisions coordinating com-
petition policy and not subsidies, while the WTO included provisions coordinating subsidies
and not competition policy. The previous chapter covered the issues surrounding the evo-
lution of subsidy rules. The same model can explain how competition policy would evolve
from coordination on stronger competition policy to no coordination.
As we showed in equation (2.1), one of the e¤ects determining the sign of the competition
policy externality is the import tari¤ revenue e¤ect. As import tari¤ revenues decrease, the
externalities fall, and the incentive for coordination on stronger competition policy decreases.




















can be negative when the political economy parameter  is su¢ ciently high.
Corollary 19. Reducing import tari¤s from noncooperative levels decreases the incentive
to coordinate on stronger competition policy.
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The model yields the prediction that if international competition policy coordination
were to take place, it would be on weaker competition policy. The historical period when
coordination on stronger competition policy was most likely was back when import tari¤s
were at high levels. Since coordination on stronger competition policy has not yet succeeded,
it likely will never succeed.
This result that reciprocal tari¤ reductions lead towards coordination on weaker com-
petition policy works against one of the main points of Horn and Levinsohn (2001): "We
show that the intuition with which many informed economists approach the links between
trade and merger policy may be misleading. The intuition is the following: trade liberal-
isation increases competition in the domestic market so liberalisation acts as a substitute
for a stricter competition policy. Hence, as trade is liberalized... rationally acting countries
will therefore pursue slacker policies than before liberalisation." Horn and Levinsohn only
briey consider supranational antitrust coordination and argue that there are no general
conditions under which it makes sense. This chapters contribution is that a particular type
of competition policy coordination (weaker) becomes more preferable with trade liberaliza-
tion, even though it remains ambiguous whether or not coordination itself becomes more
preferable. Furthermore, the desirability of antitrust coordination is tied to the strength of
the political economy parameter. Inferring that the political economy parameter is large be-
cause we observed coordination on subsidy limits narrows the set of possible outcomes from
coordination. The link between subsidy agreements and competition policy coordination is
another contribution of this chapter.
2.6. Conclusion
This chapter has argued that our monopolistic competition model of trade and domestic
policies can be applied to competition policy coordination in addition to subsidy rules. We
have argued that trade liberalization leads countries away from coordination that strengthens
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competition policy. The common thread between subsidy coordination and competition
policy coordination is that externalities arise from entry and that trade liberalization can
lead to anti-competitive forms of coordination when political economy preferences are strong.
We have so far continued to assume that governments are symmetric, though signicant
di¤erences existed in negotiations between the U.S. and U.K. in the 1940s and the U.S.
and European Union later on, so we have abstracted from any result that explains why
the U.S. and E.U. had di¤erent competition policies to begin with. The symmetric model
allows for simpler derivations, though it is not clear why going to an anti-symmetric case




Fundamental Trade Agreement Problems in Monopolistic
Competition
3.1. Introduction
When markets are imperfectly competitive, both trade policy and domestic policy choices
by governments can create cross-border externalities. Governments can use policy to shift
prots to domestic rms from foreign rms or to shift rm locations from one country
to another (Venables 1985, 1987). Whether these cross-border externalities fundamentally
matter for the design of international institutions is an important unresolved question.1
Although certain GATT and WTO rules can be interpreted as addressing externalities that
arise under imperfect competition,2 a recent literature has argued that these externalities
are not a fundamental concern that the world trading system needs to address (Bagwell and
Stagier 2009, forthcoming b, Antras and Staiger 2012). The authors show that the only
relevant externality under imperfect competition is the terms-of-trade externality, the same
one that arises under perfect competition when countries use policy to raise relative prices
of their exports (or lower relative prices of their imports) in world markets at the expense of
their trading partners. Terms-of-trade manipulation is the only source of ine¢ ciency when
countries choose tari¤s noncooperatively. When countries follow the rules and principles
1See Bagwell and Staiger (2010) for a survey on what constitutes a fundamental problem for a trade agree-
ment to solve. The authors argue, for example, that the Ossa (2011) theory of the GATT in monopolistic
competition does not describe a new fundamental problem because the trade policy externalities that moti-
vate trade agreements in his setting disappear when countries negotiate over both import policies and export
policies.
2Aside from the rst two chapters, Ossa (2011) and Mrazova (2011) argue that the GATT principles of reci-
procity and nondiscrimination can guide countries to an escape from externalities that arise under imperfect
competition.
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associated with the 1947 GATT, the terms-of-trade externality is eliminated and policy
choices are e¢ cient.
The claim that cross-border externalities arising under imperfect competition matter only
when countries deviate from 1947 GATT rules and principles leads to a puzzling observation:
the world trading system has deviated from 1947 GATT rules and principles. The path
to e¢ ciency suggested by Bagwell and Staiger (forthcoming b, 2009) is for countries to
reciprocally reduce net trade barriers over both import and export policies, but the actual
world trading system began to ban export subsidies in the 1960s among a few developed
countries and then banned them almost entirely upon the creation of the WTO in 1995.3
Another theoretically appealing GATT feature is the market access preservation rule. The
rule prevents countries from using domestic policies to upset the trade volumes anticipated
at the time countries negotiate tari¤ reductions. The rule allows countries to achieve e¢ cient
policies without resorting to contracts over specic domestic policies in trade agreements,
also known as "deep integration" (Antras and Staiger 2012). Although the GATTs drafters
understood that GATT Article XXIII could be used in lieu of subsidy rules, that seems to
have been forgotten during negotiations for the WTO subsidy rules.4
This chapter considers a trade model such that international externalities other than
terms of trade do indeed persist. The conventionally successful rules and principles of the
GATT fail to hold, and so the model o¤ers an explanation for why the world trading system
deviated from the GATT. The model considers trade between symmetric countries, home
and foreign, with a monopolistically competitive di¤erentiated sector and a freely traded
outside sector. Governments each choose two border measures (an import policy and export
policy) and two domestic policies (a conventional marginal cost subsidy and the number of
monopolistically competitive rms in each country). A distinct feature of this model from
3Bagwell and Staiger (forthcoming a) have shown that an export subsidy ban becomes defensible following
trade liberalization in a linear Cournot framework, but Bagwell and Staiger (2009) nd no rationale to ban
export subsidies in a monopolistically competitive framework.
4See Section 1.2.2.
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the prior literature is that the governmentsrm choices are a domestic policy that has
cross-border externalities without having any e¤ect on the prices of any individual product.
The study of two domestic policy choices is also an important distinction. Countries can, in
theory, set trade policies to nullify the externalities associated with one domestic policy
this is indeed the case in the rst two chapters of this dissertation but countries cannot
generally do this with more than one domestic policy choice.
The chapters rst result is that a cross-border free-rider externality in rm choice persists
even if countries act as if they do not value their ability to manipulate their terms of trade.
These policy choices dene what is known in prior work as the political optimum,5 and
they are e¢ cient when terms-of-trade is the only relevant international externality. In this
context, we will refer to the full set of policies as the unrestrained entry political optimum.
Since the entry policies cannot be used to manipulate world prices, so the politically optimal
condition for entry subsidies is the same as the noncooperative condition. To understand
why entry policy choices are ine¢ cient, rst consider countrieschoices of trade policies and
marginal cost subsidies. The conditions do not depend on the number of rms, a consequence
of the simple CES demand setting. At the unrestrained entry political optimum, policies
are set so that price equals marginal cost for all products, and there are no cross-border
externalities from shifting imperfectly competitive rents. When countries set their number
of rms, there is a positive cross-border externality as consumers gain from variety. There
is a free-rider e¤ect that implies countries choose variety below the internationally e¢ cient
level. There does exist a set of e¢ cient policies, which we denote as the e¢ cient entry
political optimum, such that the trade policies and marginal cost subsidy satisfy the political
optimum conditions, while the rm counts satisfy the e¢ ciency condition.
5The term dates from Bagwell and Staiger (1999), who use it to distinguish the e¢ cient points chosen when
countries have political preferences from the conventional optimum when countries maximize national income
(free trade in the two-good perfectly competitive model).
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The chapter next considers a market access preservation rule akin to Bagwell and Staiger
(2001a), where a foreign countrys mix of trade and domestic policy choices are constrained
to preserve foreigns import demand curve (i.e. homes access to foreigns market). A special
feature of monopolistic competition with a quasilinear outside good numeraire, noted by
Bagwell and Staiger (2009), is that the country has no ability to inuence the o¤shore price
of its imports, but a countrys domestic and export subsidies are fully passed through to the
o¤shore price of its exports.6 A market access preservation rule that only preserves foreigns
import demand will not prevent opportunistic use of domestic policies to inuence behavior
in homes domestic market. At the unrestrained entry political optimum, foreign would
cut its domestic subsidy and worsen homes terms of trade. At the e¢ cient entry political
optimum, foreign would also attempt to cut its number of rms to the detriment of home.
We next consider a market access preservation rule such that foreign must preserve homes
access to foreigns market. There are multiple potential rules to consider. First, we consider,
as in Antras and Staiger (2012), that foreign preserves its trade volume exported to home.
Consider a foreign decrease in rms and increase in export subsidy. Homes expenditure on
foreign goods then falls, since home is paying a lower price for the same volume of goods
with less variety. Home then has more domestic consumption, a higher price index, and
a lower overall objective. An alternative rule is that foreign preserves domestic unit sales.
This rule is equivalent to one preserving expenditure on foreign goods or one preserving
the home price index. Under the alternative rule, which entails a larger subsidy than the
constraint preserving the foreign trade volume, homes welfare is preserved. The loss in
variety is precisely o¤set by the terms-of-trade gain.
The results here are closely linked to the rst two chapters of this dissertation. The
rst two chapters attempt to rationalize the 1995 WTO subsidy rules and the 1948 Havana
6Another di¤erence between Bagwell and Staiger (2009) and Ossa (2011) is that Ossa considers the possibility
of income e¤ects, so one might consider that income e¤ects creates additional problems for trade agreements
in his framework. Appendix E argues that allowing for income e¤ects creates no new problems for trade
agreements in an environment where countries home import and export policy choices.
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Charter using similar models, though with a smaller set of policies. These models considered
countriesprogress towards e¢ cient policies distinct from the politically optimal policies,
which are a unique set of e¢ cient policies that are consistent with GATT rules and principles.
This chapter complements the other two chapters by arguing how pursuit of the politically
optimal policies under GATT rules and principles could fail to lead to globally e¢ cient
policies.
3.2. Trade Policy Model with Two Domestic Policy Choices
The model follows the rst chapter of the dissertation, except countries can now set
domestic marginal cost subsidies  and   and we no longer consider political economy
weights in this section ( = 1). This is the simplest setup that can illustrate how usual
GATT principles and rules will fail to yield and maintain e¢ cient policies. Adding the
marginal cost subsidy plays two roles: rst, it simplies the analysis because it yields simple
optimal policies. The net trade barriers are zero and the optimal marginal cost subsidy
sets prices equal to marginal costs. Without the marginal cost subsidy, the e¢ cient net
trade barriers cannot be solved for explicitly. Second, by having two domestic subsidies, we
prevent the possibility that countries could use the trade policies to eliminate externalities
from the domestic marginal cost subsidy. As we will show, the politically optimal policies
are those that eliminate externalities of the marginal cost subsidy, but they do not eliminate
the externalities associated with the entry subsidy.
In the model augmented with the domestic marginal cost subsidy, the local prices are
the subsidized cost with the usual CES markup:
ph =

   1(m   ), and(3.1)
pf =

   1(m   
).
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The resulting government objectives are then the same as in the rst chapter (equations
1.13) , except the subsidized prices carry through the rest of the derivation, and governments
must consider the costs of the domestic marginal cost subsidy.
G = h +
1
"  1PD + p

fnfcf   sphnhch    xhnh   f(nh) + L, and(3.2)
G = f +
1
"  1P
D +  phnhch   spfnfcf    xfnf   f(nf ) + L:
As in Bagwell and Staiger (2009), we can re-express the policy choices as local and
o¤shore prices and parameters, so we can decompose the impact of policy by the policies
impact on each price. Recall the prices are denoted by subscripts indicating origin, and the
o¤shore prices are
pwh = (1  s)ph, and(3.3)
pwf = (1  s)pf .
The welfares take the forms
G = h +
1
"  1PD + (pf   p

f   pwf )nfcf   (pwh   ph)nhch(3.4)
 (   1

ph  m)xhnh   f(nh) + L, and
G = f +
1
"  1P
D + (ph   ph   pwh )nhch   (pwf   pf )nfcf
 (   1

pf  m)xfnf   f(nf ) + L.
Prots, output, and consumption can all be written as functions of onshore prices and
rm counts, so we can express G and G as functions of onshore prices, o¤shore prices, and
rm counts, each of which are a function of the policy choices.
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The global welfare objective, W = G+G, is
W = (h +f ) +
1
"  1(PD + P
D) + (pf   pf   pf )nfcf + (ph   ph   ph)nhch
 (   1

ph  m)xhnh   (   1

pf  m)xfnf   f(nh)  f(nf ) + 2L.(3.5)
The objective does not depend on o¤shore prices.
3.3. Nash Equilibrium and Unrestrained Entry Political Optimum
The e¢ ciency of the unrestrained entry political optimum is interesting to evaluate be-
cause this is a point that symmetric countries can achieve through reciprocal trade ne-
gotiations, and its e¢ ciency here would corroborate the theoretical case that imperfectly
competitive externalities are irrelevant for the world trading system.
Before considering the e¢ ciency of the unrestrained entry political optimum, it is worth
considering what leads to ine¢ ciency at the Nash equilibrium. If the only sources of ine¢ -
ciency depend on the impact of o¤shore prices on welfare, then that suggests immediately
that eliminating terms-of-trade manipulation will achieve global e¢ ciency.
3.3.1. Sources of Ine¢ ciency at Nash Equilibrium
With some manipulation, the Nash equilibrium conditions can be written as follows:7
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The conditions reect convenient features of the model: only the export subsidy and
marginal cost subsidy a¤ect the o¤shore prices and prices of homes exports, while the
import tari¤ a¤ects only homes local price, as was also true in Bagwell and Staiger (2009).
The new features of the model are the domestic marginal cost subsidy and the entry subsidy.
The marginal cost subsidy also a¤ects the local price while the entry subsidy that determines
the rm counts has no e¤ect on any prices.
















































3.3.1.1. Trade Policy Ine¢ ciency. At Nash policies, the e¢ ciency conditions for the
traded goods are nonzero, as in Bagwell and Staiger (2009), because governments value the








=  Gpwf =  nfcf 6= 0.
Governments set export subsidies to be too low to improve their terms-of-trade. Even
though import tari¤s do not a¤ect terms-of-trade, they nonetheless cause an externality
because the trading partners government has set export policy ine¢ ciently due to terms-of-
trade motives.
3.3.1.2. Domestic Marginal Cost Subsidy Ine¢ ciency. To evaluate the Nash condi-
tion for the marginal cost subsidy, we need to decompose the home domestic price externality.
Foreign is inuenced by the prices in homes market only through the volume of exports. We




























































=  +  > 0.8
In conclusion, the Nash domestic subsidies are too low. Governments set the Nash
domestic subsidies to be too low because there is terms-of-trade improvement from setting
subsidies too low, and because foreign government policy choices are also distorted by terms-
of-trade manipulation.
3.3.1.3. Entry Policy Ine¢ ciency. For the Nash policies considered thus far, all distor-
tions are due to terms-of-trade manipulation. For the entry policy determining rm counts,
there is a free-rider e¤ect that is not determined by terms of trade.
When foreign increases its number of rms, home benets from an increase in variety
without having to use scarce capital for entry. The increase in foreign variety has a similar
e¤ect on the price index as a reduction in foreign price due to a tari¤ decrease, but unlike
the tari¤ decrease, home does not su¤er from a loss in revenue from the foreign rm entry.
Since the entry e¢ ciency condition is Gnf +G

nf
= 0 and the Nash rst order condition
is Gnf = 0, the entry choice is globally ine¢ cient if Gnf 6= 0. The sign of Gnf depends on
a balance of free-rider e¤ects, and negative externalities due to prot-shifting. The prot-
shifting externalities exist at the Nash equilibrium because terms-of-trade manipulation has
led countries to set prices above marginal cost, so foreign rm entry decreases the rents home
gets from home production.
This chapter does not attempt to sign Gnf ,at the Nash equilibrium but the e¢ ciency
of rm policy choices at Nash is not what is important for our purposes. The important
8We established in the rst chapter that the import tari¤ choices are always positive.
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result here is that an externality exists whose existence does not depend on countriesdesire
to manipulate terms of trade. We will next verify that this externality persists at the
unrestrained entry politically optimum.
3.3.2. Ine¢ ciency of the Unrestrained Entry Political Optimum
The unrestrained entry political optimum consists of the policies countries would choose if
they acted as if they did not value their ability to manipulate their terms of trade. The Nash
conditions are the same as the politically optimal conditions for the import tari¤ and rm
choices because these policies do not a¤ect terms of trade, although these variables are still
a¤ected by distortions in other policy choices.
The conditions for the unrestrained entry political optimum imply that







= Gn = G

n = 0.
In the case of the marginal cost subsidy, the subsidy a¤ects both the local price and the
terms of trade. Given that the politically optimal export subsidy is chosen, so that countries
do not value changes in the local traded price, it then the follows that there is no rst-order
e¤ect of a change in the local domestic price.
3.3.2.1. Trade Policy E¢ ciency. As in Bagwell and Staiger (2009), the politically op-
timal trade policy choices immediately imply that the global e¢ ciency conditions for trade
policy are satised: Gpf +G

pf




3.3.2.2. Domestic Marginal Cost E¢ ciency. For the global e¢ ciency condition for the
domestic marginal cost subsidy to be satised, it must hold that there is no externality from
homes local price on foreigns welfare. As mentioned in our discussion of the marginal cost
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subsidy for Nash policies, because foreign prices inuence home only through the export







. Since the e¤ects of prices on the export volume are nonzero, and the
politically optimal export subsidy condition Gpf = 0 is satised, it then follows that foreign
has no value for a marginal increase in its export volume to home, and Gph = 0, so a change
in homes domestic price has no impact on foreign welfare. Consequently, the choice of




3.3.2.3. Entry Subsidy Ine¢ ciency. Because e¢ ciency conditions are satised at the
unrestrained entry political optimum, there are no longer externalities from shifting the lo-
cation of production, since there are no longer any rents to shift. But the positive externality
from foreign product entry remains, and this leads to the entry subsidy being ine¢ cient at
the political optimum. Gn = 0 and Gn > 0 so the e¢ ciency condition is not satised. The
foreign entry subsidy gives home a benet through the price index as if home were beneting
from a foreign price decrease from tari¤ reduction, but with only the tari¤ reduction, home
also experiences a loss in revenue on the inframarginal trade volume. Consequently, home
benets from a foreign increase in variety even though home is indi¤erent regarding future
reductions in its own import tari¤.
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It is then straightforward that policies at the unrestrained entry political optimum involve
free trade and a domestic subsidy such that price equals marginal cost, e.g.  = s = 0 and
 = 1

m. At these policies, local products have price m and traded products have price
(1 + )m.
At the unrestrained entry political optimum, there is then no rst-order e¤ect of foreign
rm entry on any component of welfare other than consumer welfare, because all other
components are zero. The foreign rm entry has a positive impact on the price index:9
Gnf =
pfcf
   1 > 0.
Proposition 20. The unrestrained entry political optimum is ine¢ cient when countries
negotiate over import policies, export policies, domestic marginal cost subsidies, and entry
subsidies, due solely to the ine¢ ciency in entry subsidy choices.
3.4. Market Access Preservation Rules
This section considers the GATT rules that help countries maintain policies with desirable
e¢ ciency properties. Market access preservation rules can help countries stay at these policies
without requiring countries to contract over specic domestic policies. Countries can instead
contract on functions of multiple policies. We consider three potential forms such rules could
take and how e¤ective these rules are at the unrestrained entry political optimum and the
e¢ cient entry political optimum.
9See Appendix A.1 for comparative statics.
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3.4.1. Preserving Market Access for Exporters
The conventional form of market access rules in both the GATT negotiations of the 1940s
and the economics literature (Bagwell and Staiger 2001a), is that countries can insist upon
a rebalancing of commitments if the access to foreign markets implied by negotiated import
tari¤ reductions is undermined by domestic policy choices.
Consider the e¤ects of a reduction in the foreign domestic subsidy at either the unre-
strained entry political optimum or the e¢ cient entry political optimum. The reduction in
subsidy increases pf and raises the foreign price index P
 and increases the export volume
of home rms nhch, so home market access is preserved. Within homes market, the increase
in pf , has no rst-order on homes welfare because politically optimal policies have been
chosen, but the subsidy decrease does impact the o¤shore price pwf , so home has su¤ered a
terms-of-trade loss from foreign reducing its subsidy. Foreign benets from such a subsidy
decrease via an improvement in its terms-of-trade.
Consider the e¤ects of a reduction in the foreign entry subsidy. The reduction in subsidy
raises the foreign price index P  and homes market access is preserved. Within homes
market, the decrease in nf has no e¤ect on home through prots or government revenues
because politically optimal policies have been chosen. But homes price index P rises due to
the decrease in nf , so home is worse o¤ from the decrease in entry subsidy. At the e¢ cient
entry political optimum, foreign benets from the reduction. At the unrestrained entry
political optimum, where foreign has chosen its Nash entry subsidy, foreign is indi¤erent
regarding the reduction.
Proposition 21. A market access preservation rule that preserves the market access of
exporters does not prevent countries from reducing a domestic policy to inuence terms-of-
trade, nor does it prevent countries from reducing entry subsidies to the detriment of trading
partners.
72
3.4.2. Preserving Access to Ones Own Domestic Market
An extended market access preservation rule that has limited institutional history is one
where a country that changes its domestic policies must not only preserve conditions for
trading partners in its own market, but also must preserve trading conditions for trading
partners in their domestic markets. Such a rule was considered by Antras and Staiger
(2012). In their paper, when foreign imposes a domestic subsidy, foreign also must change
an export policy to preserve export volume to home. We nd that such a rule still allows
for opportunism from foreign, but a viable alternative exists.
An alternative is that foreign preserves domestic sales or expenditure on foreign goods
or the home price index all these rules are equivalent. Recall that home domestic sales
are nhcf = nhp h P
 ". Since homes policies are constant, nh and ph are constant, so P
must also be constant. If P is constant, then total expenditure on di¤erentiated goods
PD = P 1 " = nhphch + nfpfcf is constant. Since nhphch is constant, then nfpfcf must also
be constant.
At either political optimum, there are only two possible externalities terms-of-trade
externalities and entry externalities. We evaluate the balance of di¤erential changes in each
externality that leaves home una¤ected. Consider a rise in rms (increase in nf) and a fall in
export subsidy (increase in pwf and pf). Notice that dp
w
f = dpf =  pfds. The impact of an
increase in foreign price on home welfare is then Gpwf dp
w
f = Gpwf dpf =  nfcfdpf . The impact
o¤ an increase in entry on home welfare is Gnf =
pf cf
 1 dnf . Expressed in log derivatives,
home welfare is unchanged if and only if 1
 1 n^f = p^f . But this is precisely the combination
of changes in rms and prices that ensure that the home price index is constant.10 Thus, the
rule that ensures the price index is constant also preserves home welfare.
Proposition 22. When countries are at either the unrestrained entry or e¢ cient entry
political optimum, a market access preservation rule requiring that foreign preserves both
10See Appendix A for comparative statics.
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homes export volume and homes domestic volume will maintain the home governments
objective regardless of what mix of domestic policies and trade policies foreign might choose.
According to the proposition, foreign can preserve homes objective by targeting the
amount of domestic units home sells in each country. The preservation of the home gov-
ernments objective is not immediately obvious, since in addition to the units sold, homes
objective depends on the expenditure on foreign goods, and this expenditure matters for
both homes consumption of di¤erentiated goods and homes import tari¤ revenue. But pin-
ning down homes domestic volume pins down the home price index and homes expenditure
on foreign goods.
An immediate corollary of the previous proposition is that is not e¢ cient to require
foreign to maintain its export volume to home in lieu of requiring foreign to maintain homes
domestic volume or homes expenditure on foreign goods. To see this, consider a foreign
decrease in rms and increase in export subsidy that satises the rule so that the foreigns
export volume to home nfcf is unchanged. Since the subsidy increases, the price pf falls
and homes expenditure on foreign goods pfnfcf must have fallen. Since there has been
no change in home policies, the resulting equilibrium consumption must involve a rise in
consumption of home di¤erentiated goods and a rise in the home price index P . The foreign
subsidy chosen here is then too small to leave the home price index unchanged and preserve
homes welfare.
3.5. Conclusion
This chapter has taken a model of trade with domestic policies and monopolistic com-
petition and argued that the existence of subsidies to entry leads to ine¢ ciency even if
countries act as if they do not value their terms of trade. GATT market access rules are also
problematic, though they are redeemable. A clear extension would be to consider a model
where there is a single factor instead of two factors, and governments can choose to subsidize
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the xed cost of entry. This model would be more complicated because the number of rms
would endogenously adjust to every policy choice.
The main message of this dissertation is that cross-border externalities that arise under
imperfect competition do matter for the design of the world trading system. The claim
does not imply that terms-of-trade externalities are unimportant or that GATT principles
and rules cannot help countries achieve and maintain e¢ cient policies, but it does argue
that terms-of-trade externalities were not the only relevant externality for explaining and
evaluating the world trading system over the past six decades. Along with the externalities
that arise from the more recent rise in o¤shoring and bilateral bargaining (Antras and Staiger
forthcoming), these externalities arising from imperfect competition should be considered in
the future design of the world trading system.
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APPENDIX A
Comparative Statics
This appendix chapter derives comparative statics for government policies. Totally log-
di¤erentiating the price index equations and the demand equations yield all the comparative
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Here a^ = d log a = da=a.
The entry subsidies e and e singly determine the rm counts nh and nf , respectively.
The connection between the trade policy instruments and prices is that each trade policy
instrument a¤ects only one price. Totally di¤erentiating the traded price equations yields
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To see a connection between the e¤ects of foreign entry and foreign export subsidies,
notice that log changes in one have proportional e¤ects to log changes in the other, for the
home price index, home domestic sales, and expenditure shares: (1 ) bPcnf = bPcpf , (1 )chcnf =chcpf , and (1  ) \pfnf cfcnf = \pfnf cfcpf .
Foreign price increases always raise home sales and lower foreign sales:
bchbpf = (   ")(1  S) > 0, and(A.5) bcfbpf =    (   ")(1  S) > 1.
A.1. Trade Policy Comparative Statics
This subsection provides comparative statics for changes in home or foreign government
policies on home welfare. Symmetric results hold for foreign.
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The e¤ect of an increase in trade barriers t =    s =     s on world welfare is
(A.10)














A.2. Firm Entry Externalities Compared to Export Subsidy Externalities
Foreign rm entry has the following e¤ect on home welfare, if foreign tari¤s fall to preserve
home exports to foreign. This expression could also be thought of as the trade-promoting






































(   1)nf .
The results imply a relationship between the trade-promoting e¤ect of the foreign rm












(   1)nf .
It immediately follows that if  > 0 and dG
ds = 0 (no export policy externalities), then
dG
ds < 0. If  > 0 and
dG
dnf
jdch=0 = 0, then dGds > 0 (if export policies are chosen unilater-
ally such that dG
ds = 0, then export subsidies are ine¢ ciently low from the perspective of
maximizing world objective W ).
APPENDIX B
Existence of E¢ cient Policies
This section proves that the restriction  <  ensures that trade policies which maximize
W exist.
We derive the symmetric and e¢ cient level of trade barriers that satisfy the trade policy
e¢ ciency conditions in the baseline model. In each country, prots are  and import volume
is M . The trade elasticity with respect to prices is the same for both trade volumes  cchcph =











X(   ) + (1  X)( )+ tp M( ) = 0.
As in Bagwell and Staiger (2009), the world welfare condition is the sum of the unilateral
import tax condition (A.9) and export tax condition (A.7), less the terms-of-trade e¤ects of
the export tari¤ (pfM). The e¢ ciency condition does not depend on the individual trade
barriers chosen independent of the total trade barriers t.
The rst-order condition implicitly denes the solution for t:






The number of rms and output divide out of the rst-order condition a consequence of
the CES assumption and symmetry. Solving for the optimal rm count is not necessary to
characterize the e¢ cient policies.
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The rst order condition reects the tradeo¤ between correcting the imperfectly com-
petitive distortion in traded goods and distorting the balance of consumption between home
and foreign goods. Recall that X, the share of production spent at home, depends on t, as
does .
We show that the e¢ cient level of trade subsidies falls between zero and the subsidy
that fully corrects the foreign distortion. First, we can rule out positive net trade barriers
(t > 0) as optima, as these further distort the marginal cost of consumption away from
the marginal benet abroad there is no redistribution motive in the baseline model that
would lead positive trade taxes to be e¢ cient. We can establish existence by showing that





t) is negative at free trade and positive at the subsidy that
yields rst-best consumption in traded goods. There exist  and  su¢ ciently high such
that g0(t) is increasing at free trade, so we cannot rely on global concavity to prove existence
and uniqueness.






< 0. The negative sign of this expression reects
that countries optimally make some attempt to correct the monopoly distortion in traded
goods.












t satises h(0) > 0, and as t !  1   , h(t) ! 

  1 < 0. At t, g(t) =
 X(t) > 0. The result reects that countries would not subsidize to ensure rst-best
consumption in traded goods, since it would excessively distort consumption away from
domestic goods.
Since g(t) is continuous and di¤erentiable, and we have shown that g(0) < 0 and g(t) > 0,
then there must exist an optimum teff in (t; 0) such that g(teff ) = 0 and g0(teff ) < 0.
To establish uniqueness, suppose the conditions g(teff ) = 0, g0(teff ) < 0, and teff < 0 are
not uniquely satised. Let teff be the point closest to zero satisfying the conditions, so there
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are no optima in the interval (teff ; 0]. We can establish that for all t < teff , g0(t) < 0:
expanding the derivative of g0(t), all the positive terms receive weight S or X and become
smaller as subsidies increase (domestic consumption becomes smaller), while all the negative
terms receive weight (1 X) and become larger as subsidies increase (foreign consumption
becomes larger). Consequently, g(t) > 0 for all t < teff . and since there were no equilibrium
in (teff ; 0) by assumption, teff is the unique equilibrium.
APPENDIX C
Lemma Proofs


















ds = 0. Then 
N , sN , tC do not depend on e, N > 0, and
tN > tC.
Proof. N , sN , and tc do not depend on e because under symmetric policies, rm counts
are the same, and drop out of all the rst-order conditions.





chcpf = bcfcpf > 0, because chcpf > 0 and bcfcpf < 0 (a foreign price increase improves homes
sales and lowers homes imports).
tN > tC : Substituting the Nash policy conditions (dG
ds
= 0) and (dG
dt
= 0 ) into the
externality equations we get dG
ds > 0 and
dG
d < 0 (see Appendix Section A.1), which implies
countries can benet from cooperatively reducing trade barriers from Nash policies. 
Lemma 2 Consider arbitrary import tari¤ policies and entry subsidies, and export sub-




ds = 0 Then s   and s   .








cchcph < 0, s < 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< 0 and dG
d < 0). If home and foreign choose noncooperative import tari¤s to
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maximize their objectives, holding other policies xed, then the noncooperative import tari¤s
are higher than the cooperative import tari¤s that maximize W .
Proof. The import tari¤ externality expression (A.6) implies the externality has the same
sign as s  






< 0 and dG
d < 0 follows. For the Nash









= 0 at the





chcpf + pcf bcfcpf ). ( p )chchcpf > 0 and pcf bcfcpf < 0, so a lower
tari¤ than the Nash tari¤ is necessary to induce a positive dG
d
. 
Lemma 6: There exists a set B of scale parameters  for the function k(e); such that
there exists a GATT equilibrium at zero import tari¤s when  2 B.
Proof. Let M > MN be a symmetric export volume greater than the export volume at Nash
policies. We show we can nd a  such that there is a GATT equilibrium at zero import
tari¤s with export volume M , and by varying M , this maps out the set B of  values such
that we know a zero-tari¤ GATT equilibrium exists. Let  ; s;and e be the policies countries
choose at the GATT equilibrium with export volume M . We can scale the function k(e) so
that countries choose zero import tari¤s. Write k(e) = k(e) for some k > 0 yet to be
determined, and  is a function that satises our restrictions for k from Subsection 2.2, and
let  have scale parameter . The condition for the constrained optimal choice of e can then
be written as F ( ; s; e) = k;for some function F ( ; s; e), which is strictly positive because 
is positive, and both consumer welfare and total prots are increasing in the entry subsidy.
The market access constraint gives us e as a function of  and the unilateral export condition
gives us s( ; e()). If we choose k = F (0; s(0; e(0)); e(0)), then the resulting function k has
scale parameter  = k, the choices of s and e are optimal subject to the market constraint,
and the policies (0; s(0; e(0)); e(0)) determine a GATT equilibrium with zero tari¤s. 
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Lemma 8: Consider a set a constraints X = 0. Adding entry subsidy limits to the
set of constraints improves a GATT equilibrium subject to the set of constraints X = 0 if
dG
dnf
jdX=0 < 0. Adding export subsidy limits improves the GATT equilibrium if dGds jdX=0 < 0.
Proof. At the GATT equilibrium with rms n^f , dG

dnf
jdX=0 = 0. Since dGdnf jdX=0 < 0,
dW
dnf
jdX=0 < 0. As discussed in Section 1.3.1, the reduced-form cost function f(n) is such
that G is concave in nf . By concavity in nf , there must exist nf < n^f in the neighborhood
of n^f such that at nf , dWdnf jdX=0 < 0, dGdnf jdX=0 < 0, and dG

dnf
jdX=0 > 0. As the foreign govern-
ment objective is increasing and concave in nf within the constraint set nf  nf , the GATT
equilibrium with constraint nf  nf must bind at nf < n^f and countries will achieve greater
welfare since dW
dnf
jdX=0 < 0 within the interval (nf ; n^f ). A parallel proof applies for the home
tari¤ choices, and a similar proof applies for the export subsidy choices. 
APPENDIX D
Proof of Proposition 17
































The rst term is the e¤ect on consumer surplus, the rst set of brackets contains the
e¤ects in the domestic market (home prots and tari¤ revenue), and the second set of
brackets contains the e¤ects in the third market (export prots and export policy costs).
There are no e¤ects in the foreign market due to Article XXIII.






























The rst bracketed expression is comparable to the home unilateral import policy condition,
while the second is comparable to the home unilateral export policy condition. Substituting



























nf (   1) .
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The rst bracketed expression is negative. Home still loses domestic prots from foreign rm
entry as in the zero-tari¤case of the previous section, but the losses have been scaled down by
the price elasticites of import demand ( bcfcpf and
ccghcpgh ) which both equal   ( ")(1  S) <  1.
To sign dG
dnf
, rst compare the consumer gain pfnfcf to the second bracketed expression.
For symmetric policies pfnfcf = phnhc
g
h. Because own price e¤ects are stronger than cross-
price e¤ects,  ccghcpgf =















nf (   1)
.




















Income E¤ects, Imperfect Competition, and Trade Agreements
Most of this dissertation has considered the possibility that domestic policies create prob-
lem for trade agreements under monopolistic competition. Both Bagwell and Staiger (2009)
and the third chapter of this dissertation found that imperfect competition did not lead to
problems when countries have only import and export policies, but both papers relied on
consumers with quasilinear preferences. Ossa (2011), who showed that negotiations over
import tari¤s alone creates a problem for trade agreements, used a framework with Cobb-
Douglas preferences over the di¤erentiated aggregate and the outside good, and therefore
there were income e¤ects. A natural question then is whether negotiations over both im-
port and export policies continues to lead to no new problems for trade agreements under
imperfect competition when countries have income e¤ects.
This appendix section proposes a model with quite general government preferences over
local prices and each countrys income. Governments can choose to tax or subsidize ei-
ther imports or exports, but no domestic policies. Following Bagwell and Staiger (1999),
governments cannot lose from terms-of-trade appreciation or benet from terms-of-trade de-
terioration. The model imposes a stronger restriction than Bagwell and Stagier (1999) in
assuming that governments value trade policy only through its e¤ects on trade tax revenue
and the local prices faced by either nation.1
Following Bagwell and Staiger, we consider the question of whether policies are e¢ ciently
chosen at the political optimum. The political optimum is one that countries can achieve
by making reciprocal reductions in import taxes and export taxesor increases in export
1The Bagwell and Staiger (2002) appendix imposes a similar restriction in a multi-country, many good trade
policy model while addressing a distinct research question from mine.
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subsidies. Starting from these policies, governments do not achieve any rst-order gains
from changes in local prices. They do, however, gain from changes in their terms of trade.
What then remains to be shown is that governments cannot mutually benet from further
cooperation in setting world prices, holding local prices xed.
This section rst shows that the political optimum is e¢ cient when countries choose only
import and export policies. A technical result makes it clear that in this general setting there
is no further room for cooperation beyond the political optimum. The ratio of rst-order
changes in each countrys trade tax revenue will be constant in response to any small change
in any world prices from the political optimum. This result reduces the several channels
by which trade policy can inuence welfare down to one independent channel. Proving the
e¢ ciency of politically optimal policies then becomes as straightforward as in the Bagwell
and Staiger (1999) framework, which allows for only one world price. In conclusion, the
Bagwell and Staiger (2009) result does extend to a setting with income e¤ects.
E.1. The Model
We use a static, two-country model with many goods and many prices. There is no
specic structure on rms or consumers in the economy, other than assuming that agents
decisions are pinned down by all home and foreign prices, endowments, and net trade tax
revenue in the economy. Prices here refers to both the prices consumers pay and the prices
producers receive. Trade tax revenue is assumed to collected by governments and then
redistributed in whatever manner they consider to be optimal. Trade tax revenue is derived




Governments choose their trade policies to maximize welfare. The strongest assumption I
make on government preferences is that governments value trade policies only through their
e¤ects on trade tax revenues or any prices faced in either nation. Government indirect
utility functions are assumed to exist with the form
Wh = Wh(P; Th; Tf ; )
Wf = Wf (P; Th; Tf ; )
where P is the vector of all home and foreign local prices, Th and Tf are total home and
foreign net trade tax revenue, respectively, and  is a vector of endowments and all other
parameters that are invariant to trade. These government utility functions are su¢ ciently
general to allow for preferences over any distributional outcome in any economy, provided
that the choices of rms and consumers are all also functions of prices, trade tax revenue,
and endowments. By assumption there is a unique equilibrium in the world economy, taking
government trade policies as given.
E.1.2. Local Prices and Trade Taxes
The vector P can be divided into subvectors:
P  (ph; ph; rh; rh; pf ; pf ; rf ; rf )
where p denotes consumer prices and r denotes prices producers receive. The h and f
subscript denote nation of origin, home and foreign respectively, and the star indicates the
destination is the foreign nation.
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Governments can choose ad valorem trade taxes or subsidies for all goods. Trade policies
and prices are linked by the equations








pfg = (1 + thg + tfg + g)rfg
Here g indexes goods. The consumer price phg is for a home export to foreign, t

hg is homes
export policy (positive for a tax and negative for a subsidy), t
fg
is foreigns import policy,
g is a transport cost for exports to foreign, and r

hg is the price domestic consumers receive
for exports. The notation for foreigns exports follows a similar pattern.
Net trade tax revenue is implicitly dened as the sum of each nations trade taxes and























where xh and xf denote home and foreign export volume, respectively. The denition is
implicit because the export volumes can depend on the net trade tax revenue.
E.1.3. Dening Terms-of-Trade
The terms-of-trade are dened to be the world prices in between nations borders. Formally,
pwhg  (1 + thg)rhg(E.1)
pwfg  (1 + tfg)rfg
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where pwhg and p
w
fg are the world prices of home and foreign exports, respectively, which are
the producer prices augmented by the exporting nations export policy.
Given this denition of world prices, government welfare and tari¤ revenue can be rewrit-






(pwhg   rhg)xhg +
X
g









where pw is the vector of home and foreign terms-of-trade. Writing the tari¤ revenue as a
function of prices and endowments relies on the assumption that export policies are pinned
down by local prices P , trade tax revenue, and endowments.
Government welfare can then be written as follows
Wh(P; p
w; ) = Wh(P; Th(P; p
w; ); Tf (P; p
w; ); )
Wf (P; p
w; ) = Wf (P; Th(P; p
w; ); Tf (P; p
w; ); )
Having written welfare in this form, we introduce the assumption that governments
weakly benet from terms-of-trade improvement and weakly su¤er from terms-of-trade de-


























Similar restrictions are assumed for the foreign nation. We assume strict inequality for at
least one element of pwh and p
w
f . Terms-of-trade change, holding prices xed, amounts to
a direct income transfer between nations, so this assumption rules out the possibility that
any nation would use trade policy as a means to make an income transfer. This assumption
could be justied on the grounds that nations have other means to make such transfers.
Similar restrictions on the e¤ects of terms-of-trade changes on welfare were made in Bagwell
and Staiger (1999).
E.2. Results
This section establishes that if a trade agreement forces governments to act as if they
do not value the rents they gain from terms-of-trade changes, then the trade policies chosen
are e¢ cient. Following Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2009), we dene these policies to be
politically optimal. The exposition and proof of this result proceed as follows (1) formally
dene noncooperative and politically optimal tari¤s, (2) establish the condition that needs
to be satised for politically optimal tari¤s to be e¢ cient, (3) show how this condition has
been satised by previous papers in this literature, and (4) introduce a technical result that
allows for the e¢ ciency of political optimal tari¤s to be satised more generally.
This section provides an overview of the main reasons, while proofs are provided in the
following section.
E.2.1. Noncooperative and Politically Optimal Tari¤s
Following Bagwell and Staiger (1999), noncooperative and political optimal tari¤s are as-
sumed to exist. Nations neither desire innite subsidies nor innite taxes, so noncooperative
solutions are in the interior of the nations policy space. For notational convenience,  ih in-
dex homes trade policies and  jf index foreigns trade policies, whether they be import or







= 0 8i; j
The derivatives of trade policies can be decomposed into their e¤ects that operate through





































The politically optimal policies are those chosen when nations act as if they do not value


















E.2.2. Conditions for E¢ ciency
Having formally dened Nash and politically optimal trade policies, we can then answer the
following questions: Is there any reason for a trade agreement? Are trade agreements that
cause governments to choose politically optimal policies e¢ cient?
The necessary condition for e¢ ciency is a tangency condition between home and foreign
welfare with respect to all pairings of trade policies. This condition results from the standard
constrained optimization problem for one nation maximizing welfare, while preserving the
other nations level of welfare. Following Bagwell and Staiger (1999) we assume that the











 0, 8i; j










6= 0 for some i and j. In the next section
we show the latter result follows from the distinct e¤ects home and foreign trade policies
have on world prices. Thus, a trade agreement is necessary because noncooperative policies
are not Pareto e¢ cient.
Substituting in the denition of political optimal tari¤s (E.5) yields the following condi-









 0, 8i; j
This condition is equivalent to the statement that there is no combination of small trade
policies that can alter world prices, holding local prices xed, in a manner that makes both
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nations better o¤. If this condition holds, nations have no reason to negotiate once they
have reached the political optimum.
E.2.3. Special Cases From Prior Literature
For sake of comparison, we show how that condition (E.7) is satised in prior literature by
stronger assumptions than we have imposed.
In Bagwell and Staiger (1999), international externalities inuence welfare through one
world relative price, whose movements shift each governments welfare in opposite directions.
Thus, mutually benecial gains through negotiations over this one world relative price are





























  0, 8i;
Terms with like brackets and parentheses cancel, so the equality condition above holds.
The inequality condition follows from the assumption that shifts in terms of trade move each









In Bagwell and Staiger (2009), income e¤ects on demand are assumed away. Holding local
prices xed, net trade tax revenue and all other consumption choices are xed, so negotiations
over world-prices amount to zero-sum shifts in trade tax revenue between nations. This can






condition (E.7) then obviously holds because the ratios in (E.8) each reduce to  1.
In our more general framework, the satisfaction of (E.7) is not obvious because trade
policies on many goods o¤er many world price channels for inuencing welfare. Prior lit-
erature does not rule out the possibility that there exists some shift in world prices that
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could lead to mutually benecial gains, thus leaving nations with room to negotiate from
the politically optimal policies.
E.2.4. Proving E¢ ciency
To show the e¢ ciency of politically optimal tari¤s holds more generally, we establish a
technical result that makes it obvious in my general setting that there is no further room
for cooperation beyond the politically optimal policies. I show that the ratio of rst-order
changes in each countrys trade tax revenue will be constant in response to any small change
of any world prices. This result reduces the several channels by which trade policy can
inuence welfare down to one independent channel.
The result derives from the observation that the sum of tari¤ revenue has no dependence
on world prices:
(E.9)
Th + Tf =
X
g
(phg   rhg(1 + g))xhg(P; Th; Tf ; ) +
X
g
(pfg   rfg(1 + g))xfg(P; Th; Tf ; )
Consider any linear combination of world prices determined by a real constant vector c.
Implicitly di¤erentiating this expression with respect to any linear combination c0pw, while










This result implies that any trade policy, holding local prices xed, must a¤ect home and
foreign tari¤ revenue by the same proportion. Formally,


































This expression implies that at the political optimum, home and foreign tari¤ revenue are
linearly dependent channels through which trade policy inuences welfare. Thus, the many
channels by which trade policy can inuence welfare have been reduced to one. Rewriting












































Again, the terms in like brackets cancel, and the equality condition of (E.7) holds. I must
still show that the inequality condition of (E.7) holds. We show in the following section
that the inequality condition follows from the technical condition we derived (E.10) and the
assumed e¤ect of terms-of-trade on welfare (E.3).
Thus, we have shown that (E.7) holds generally in our model, and politically optimal
tari¤s are indeed always e¢ cient. This completes the proof that an agreement is e¢ cient if
countries act as if they do not value the rent-shifting from terms of trade.
E.3. Proofs
Claim 23. Nash policies are ine¢ cient.
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= 0, it remains to
be shown that dWh
djf
6= 0 or @Wf
@ ih
6= 0. I will focus on dWf
djh
6= 0. Choose good index g such
thatg@Wf
@pwhg
< 0, where g exists by assumption,  gh is an export policy, and 
g
f is an import policy









because the derivatives on price only
depend on the sum  gh + 
g



































Now consider the world price pwi . The derivative
dpwhg
dgh


















































for all real vectors c.
Proof. Implicitly di¤erentiating the expression for the sum of the trade tax revenue, holding
prices xed,
Th + Tf =
X
g
(phg   rhg(1 + g))xhg(P; Th; Tf ; ) +
X
g




























































(pfg   (1 + g)rfg)@xfg@Tf










































 0 always, and the inequality condition for ine¢ ciency always holds.




















Intuitively, there is no change in home tari¤s through changes in world prices that would

























The desired result follows from combining these equations. 
APPENDIX F
Extensions
F.1. Model with No Domestic Consumers
A common simplication in the strategic trade literature is that countries have no do-
mestic market for their products. The baseline model of Brander and Spencer (1985) and
the three-country model of Bagwell and Staiger (forthcoming b) make such an assumption.
The assumption eliminates the results of the rst chapter. Observe the e¢ cient trade policy





( M)( ) + p M( ) = 0.
Countries set export subsidies to  =  

and eliminate the monopoly and political economy







 cMcnf = 0.
The e¢ cient trade policies eliminate any foreign rm externality and there is no role for
trade agreements to coordinate entry-promoting policies.
F.2. Mirror Image Economy
The e¢ cient policies in the baseline economy involve negative net trade barriers, regard-
less of the political economy weight. The result contrasts with Bagwell and Staiger (1999),
where political economy motives can lead countries to agree on positive tari¤s. The lack
of distributive motives arises because the economy has a single factor. One way to address
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this is to add a second factor to the economy. A simpler way to add a distributional mo-
tive is to have mirror image imperfectly competitive sectors in each country, much like the
two-industry economy of Krugman (1980).
Total number of rms is the same in each country: nh = nf = n. A share  > :5 rms
produce in industry a in home, and b abroad, so
nha = nfb = n, and
nhb = nfa = (1  )n.
Preferences are such that the elasticity of substitution is  between goods within an
industry, but the elasticity of substitution is ! between the composite goods of each industry,
where ! 2 ("; ). The preferences yield the following demands:
xh = p
 P  ! P






















The relevant price indices are










1  + nfp1 f )
1
1  , P  = (nfp




1  + nbfp1 f )
1
1  , and P b = (nbfp




Under symmetry we have P = P , Pa = P b , and Pb = P

a .














Dene Sa and S

b similarly for foreign consumersexpenditure share. Notice that Sa > Sb,
Sa = S

b , Sb = S

a, and Sa + Sb = 1.













Dene similar shares for foreign production and consumption. The subscript denotes location
of production while the superscript denotes the location of consumption. Notice that Sha =
Sfb > :5, S

fa = Shb, S

hb = Sfa < :5, and Sfb = S

ha.
A tari¤ increase by both countries has the following e¤ects on the price indices:
P^ = SaP^ + SbP^ = (Sa(1  Sha) + Sb(1  Shb)) p^f , and








Sa(1  Sfa) + Sb (1  Sfb)

p^h.
Since Sb(1   Shb) > Sa(1   Sha), the tari¤ has a much larger benet for the minority good
in each country, which creates the motive for redistribution. The motive allows for the
possibility of positive tari¤s in a cooperative equilibrium, if the minority industry in each
country receives a political economy weight su¢ ciently larger than the weight of the majority
industry.
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F.3. Single Factor Economy
This subsection considers how the rst chapters results hold up in a model like Ossa
(2011) where there is a single labor factor for both the xed cost and marginal cost of
production. As in the rst chapters framework, the wage is constant for all factors in both
countries.
Consider governments which choose a trade policy and a subsidy for the xed cost of
production. A consequence of such an environment is that there are no prots in equilibrium
and rm production is fh
m
(   1), regardless of foreign policy changes.
The market clearing condition for home rms can be written as
nhch + (1 + )nhc

h = nhxh.
Consider a change in foreign policy mix that lowers xed costs and raises tari¤s to preserve
homes export volume to foreign. The policy change increases foreign rms, naturally, and
home rms exit due to the tougher competition. Such a policy change has no e¤ect on home
prices or output or exports, so the log di¤erential of the market clearing condition is
Xh(n^h + c^h) = n^h.
And since c^h = (   1)P^ :1
P^ =
(1 Xh)
Xh(   1) n^h < 0.
The fall in home rms implies a lower home price index which increases home welfare.
Intuitively, if home rms exit when a zero-prot condition is in place, the home rms must
be selling less to domestic consumers, which can only happen if consumers are better o¤
1Ossa uses a Cobb-Douglas utility function for the outside sector and di¤erentiated sector instead of a
quasilinear function, so the elasticity of consumption with respect to the price index is (   1) instead of
(   ").
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from the change in foreign policy mix. Furthermore, if home is subsidizing entry, homes
subsidy costs fall, providing an additional benet.
The model can be augmented with mobility frictions that give home workers benet
to having production at home, but such an extension just moves the model closer to the
rst chapters specic factor baseline model, which is a much simpler though more extreme
approach. The result suggests that such frictions are central to the existence of the WTO
subsidy rules.
F.4. Single Sector Economy
Consider a Krugman (1980) model without any outside sector (also studied by Gros 1987
and Ch. 7.1-7.2 of Helpman and Krugman 1989). Here there is no outside sector to pin
down the wages, and a change in foreign policy mix has no e¤ect on the number of rms or
output at home.
The market clearing condition is ch + (1 + )ch = xh. A change in foreign policy mix
which preserves foreign exports has no e¤ect on the entry and production levels of home
rms, so it must also preserve home consumption and the real wage of home consumers w
P
.
The result would hold true even if there were specic factors for the xed requirement of
production. The result suggests that having multiple sectors of the economy is crucial to
the results, but the model is still reasonable because trade negotiations often take place over
sectors that are small relative to the rest of the economy.
